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Strategies under Strategic Uncertainty
Helene Mass
Abstract
I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete information
who faces uncertainty about the other players’ strategies. I propose a new decision
criterion which works in two steps. First, I assume common knowledge of rationality
and eliminate all strategies which are not rationalizable. Second, I apply the maximin
expected utility criterion. Using this decision criterion, one can derive predictions
about outcomes and recommendations for players facing strategic uncertainty. A
bidder following this decision criterion in a first-price auction expects all other bidders
to bid their highest rationalizable bid given their valuation. As a consequence, the
bidder never expects to win against an equal or higher type and resorts to win against
lower types with certainty.
JEL classification: C72, D81, D82, D83
Keywords: Auctions, Incomplete Information, Informational Robustness,
Rationalizability
1 Introduction
I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete information who
faces strategic uncertainty. Formally, a player faces strategic uncertainty if the smallest set
of strategies such that the player knows that the other players’ true strategy is an element
of this set, is not a singleton. I propose a new decision criterion which works in two steps:
First, I assume common knowledge of rationality and eliminate all actions which are not
best replies. That is, the set of the other players’ possible strategies is restricted to the set
of rationalizable strategies. Afterwards, I apply the maximin expected utility criterion.
Using this decision criterion, I can derive recommendations for a player facing strategic
uncertainty. Furthermore, I analyze outcomes under the assumption that every player in
the game uses this decision criterion. In sections 2-4 I consider a game with incomplete
information under strategic uncertainty with common knowledge of type distributions.
In an extension in section 5 I discuss how the proposed decision criterion can be applied
under the presence of both, distributional and strategic uncertainty.
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Before I explain the decision criterion in more detail, I argue why strategic uncertainty
can occur in games (of complete or incomplete information). Consider a game and a player
who has to decide about her strategy. There may exist strategy profiles which formally
fulfill the conditions of a (Bayes-) Nash equilibrium. However, a player may be uncertain
whether her opponents employ such strategies and consequently face strategic uncertainty.
As stated by Pearce (1984), “some Nash equilibria are intuitively unreasonable and not
all reasonable strategy profiles are Nash equilibria”. He argues that if players cannot
communicate, then a player will best reply to Nash equilibrium strategies only if she is
able to deduce these equilibrium strategies. However, a player may consider more than one
strategy of the other players’ as possible. For example, this can occur under the existence
of multiple Nash equilibria without one being focal or salient (Bernheim (1984)). Thus, a
Nash equilibrium may not be a suitable decision criterion if a player does not observe or
does not deduce a unique conjecture about the other players’ strategies. Similarly, Renou
and Schlag (2010) argue that “common knowledge of conjectures, mutual knowledge of
rationality and utilities, and existence of a common prior” are required in order to justify
Nash equilibria as a decision criterion.
So far, I argued that a player may not know which strategies are played by the other
players. But a player may not consider all strategies of the other players as possible. The
fact that rational players interact strategically given some commonly known rules of a
game (e.g. the rules of a first-price auction), already contains information about the set
of possible strategies. Therefore, in the first step of the decision criterion I propose to
consider strategies which a player can deduce only from common knowledge of rationality.
Under strategic uncertainty a player is rational if her action is a best reply given her
type, the commonly known type distribution and a conjecture about the other players’
strategies. A strategy which a player assumes to be played by another rational player
has to be rational as well, i.e. the action prescribed by a strategy for a given type has to
be a best reply given the type, the commonly known type distribution and a conjecture
about the other players’ strategies. This reasoning continues ad infinitum. Pearce (1984)
and Bernheim (1984) (and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003b) for games of incomplete
information) show that common knowledge of rationality is equivalent to bidders playing
rationalizable strategies 1. These are strategies which survive the iterated elimination of
1For games of incomplete information where also the type distribution is not known, i.e. only the
type spaces and action spaces are common knowledge, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003b) use the term
belief-free rationalizable strategies. If additional information about possible strategies or distributions is
common knowledge, i.e. more than the type spaces and the action spaces is common knowledge, they use
the term ∆-rationalizable strategies. If the type distribution is common knowledge but nothing besides
the actions spaces is known about strategies, they use the term rationalizable strategies. I will use the
term rationalizable strategies throughout the paper.
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actions which are not best replies to some strategy which consists of actions which have
not been eliminated in previous elimination rounds.
In the second step I apply the maximin expected utility criterion due to Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989). A player applying this criterion chooses the action which maximizes
her minimum expected utility given her type. The application of the maximin expected
utility criterion can be modeled as a simultaneous zero-sum game against an adverse
nature whose action space consists of the other players’ rationalizable strategies. Given
the strategy of the adverse nature, the player applying the maximin criterion chooses the
action which maximizes her expected utility. The adverse nature’s utility is the player’s
expected utility multiplied by -1.
In other words, under the proposed decision criterion a player facing strategic uncertainty
forms a subjective belief about the other players’ strategies and acts optimally given this
subjective belief. The first step of the decision criterion determines the set from which a
player chooses her subjective belief. The second step determines how the subjective belief
is chosen. The subjective belief is given by the adverse nature’s equilibrium strategy, in
the following called subjective maximin belief. In order to distinguish the Nash equilibrium
in the simultaneous game between a player and the adverse nature and the Bayes-Nash
equilibrium which may exist in a given game of incomplete information, I will refer to the
Nash equilibrium in the former case as a maximin equilibrium.
By assuming common knowledge of rationality and applying the maximin expected
utility criterion, I am able to derive recommendations for players facing distributional and
strategic uncertainty. Moreover, I characterize outcomes under the assumption that every
player follows the proposed decision criterion.
The following two examples illustrate two different reasons for why strategic uncertainty
can occur and how the proposed decision criterion applies under strategic uncertainty.
In the first example there exist multiple Nash equilibria without one being salient. In
the second example a salient Nash equilibrium exists but is not the unique rationalizable
action. In particular, the salient Nash equilibrium is not compatible with actions derived
from the maximin utility or minimax regret criterion. Afterwards, I will summarize the
results for first-price auctions under strategic uncertainty and provide the results for the
extension of the decision criterion to both, distributional and strategic uncertainty.
For the first example consider a sender who has to deposit a package either in places
A, B or C. A receiver has to decide to which places she sends one or two drivers in order
to pick up the package. If the package is picked up, sender and receiver earn each a utility
of P and zero otherwise. In addition, the receiver faces a cost of c if a driver travels to
place A or B and a cost of c˜ if a driver travels to place C. The game is summarized in the
following utility table:
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A B C AB AC BC
A P ;P − c 0;−c 0;−c˜ P ;P − 2c P ;P − c− c˜ 0;−c− c˜
B 0;−c −c˜ P ;P − c 0;−c˜−c˜+ α P ;P − 2c 0;−c− c˜ P ;P − c− c˜
C 0;−c 0;−c P ;P − c˜ 0;−2c 0;P − c− c˜ P ;P − c− c˜
Assume it is common knowledge that it holds P − c˜ < −c and P − 2c > −c. The Nash
equilibria in this game are (A;A), (B;B) and both players mixing between A and B with
probability 1
2
. Although Nash equilibria exist, the players may be uncertain about each
other’s strategy since there does not exist a particularly salient one. The application of the
maximin criterion leaves both players indifferent between actions A and B. The maximin
criterion does not yield to action AB for the receiver since by choosing AB she would
face the risk that the sender deposits the package in C, leaving the receiver with the costs
of two drivers −2c. However, the result of the maximin criterion changes after assuming
common knowledge of rationality. Excluding actions which are not best replies leads to
the elimination of strategies C, AC and BC for the receiver, leading to the elimination of
action C for the sender:
A B AB
A P ;P − c 0;−c P ;P − 2c
B 0;−c −c˜ P ;P − c −c˜ P ;P − 2c
Now the maximin criterion leads to action AB for the receiver. In other words, if the
receiver anticipates that the sender anticipates that she will never send a driver to C, the
application of the maximin criterion leads to action AB. In this case, the receiver earns a
utility of P − 2c with certainty. If she would follow a Nash equilibrium strategy or apply
the maximin criterion directly, she would face the risk of getting a utility of −c.
As a second example consider the following utility table. It illustrates the decision
problem of a player who is uncertain about which of the possible rationalizable actions
her opponent will choose:
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X Y Z
A 10;10 0;9 0,0
B 15;1 5;9 0,0
C 14;1 4;9 4;0
D 11;10 6;9 0;0
The unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, (A,X), is focal in the sense that it is
the social optimum and leads to the highest possible utility for both players. However, a
rational column player can also choose Y instead of X. Action Y is rationalizable and
moreover, the application of the maximin or the minimax regret criterion would lead to
action Y for the column player. In other words, the column player may prefer to get a
utility of 9 with certainty instead of aiming for the utility of 10 and risking to get a utility
of 1. Given this uncertainty about the column player’s strategy, the row player may resort
to the application of the maximin criterion. This leads to action C which ensures a utility
of 4 for the row player. However, the row player can anticipate that action Z is strictly
dominated for the column player. After the elimination of this action, C becomes strictly
dominated for the row player. The iterated elimination of actions which are not best
replies, i.e. the elimination of actions Z and C, leads to the following utility table:
X Y
A 10;10 0;9
B 15;1 5;9
D 11;10 6;9
Now the application of the maximin criterion leads to action B for the row player.
That is, after anticipating that the column player will never play Z, the row player can
ensure a utility of 5 instead a utility of 4.
These examples show how the proposed decision criterion provides recommendations
under strategic uncertainty. Moreover, they show why players may not expect their
opponents to play Nash equilibria and why the application of the maximin utility criterion
alone may cause forgone profits. After discussing the two examples, I provide an intuition
and a summary of the results for first-price auctions where bidders’ valuations are identically
and independently distributed according to a commonly known distribution function.
Consider the simple example of a first-price auction with two bidders who can have either a
valuation of zero with probability p or a valuation of 1 with probability 1−p. For simplicity,
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assume an efficient tie-breaking rule. We have to compute the highest rationalizable bids
of each type. The highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation zero is zero. If a
bidder with valuation 1 bids zero, she gets an expected utility of p. Hence, bidding too
close to the own valuation (or even above) cannot be rational for a 1-type.
b1 = 1− p 10
The highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation 1 makes her indifferent
between winning against the 0-type by bidding zero and winning with probability one.
That is, it is obtained by the equation2
1− b1 = p ⇔ b1 = 1− p.
A bidder with valuation 1 who applies the proposed decision criterion has the subjective
maximin belief that the other bidder with valuation 1 bids b1. Therefore, her best reply is
to win against the 0-type of the other bidder with certainty by bidding zero.
For the general case with an arbitrary number of bidders and valuations, for every
type there exists a unique highest rationalizable bid. A bidder applying the proposed
decision criterion assumes that every other bidder places the highest rationalizable bid
given her type. As a consequence, the bidder never expects to win against a bidder with
an equal or higher type and therefore bids the highest rationalizable bid of a lower type in
order to win against the lower type with certainty. If every bidder applies this decision
criterion, then every bidder has the same beliefs about distributions and strategies. Every
bidder calculates which highest rationalizable bid of a lower type maximizes her expected
utility. It turns out that due to the symmetry of beliefs about valuation distributions
and strategies, the higher the type of the bidder, the higher is the type whose highest
rationalizable bid maximizes her expected utility. Therefore, the outcome is efficient, i.e.
the bidder with the highest valuation wins the auction with probability one.
In an extension I analyze both, distributional and strategic uncertainty. In this case the
strategy space of the adverse nature consists of all rationalizable strategies and all possible
valuation distributions. For a restriction of the set of possible distributions I assume
common knowledge of an exogenously given mean µ of bidders’ valuations.3 Although in
reality bidders go at great lengths in order to learn about their competitors’ valuations,
2For the case with two possible valuations the highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with the higher
valuation coincides with the highest bid played in the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium. With more than
two valuations the highest rationalizable bid of a type is strictly higher than the highest bid played in the
unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
3The assumption of common knowledge of an exogenously given mean under distributional uncertainty
has been used before. See for example Montiero (2009).
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such learning has its limits and bidders may be able to learn only the support and the
mean of the valuation distribution.
Under strategic uncertainty with common knowledge of rationality and distributional
uncertainty with common knowledge of an exogenously given mean, as before, for every
type there exists a unique highest rationalizable bid. A bidder applying the proposed
decision criterion assumes that every other bidder places the highest rationalizable bid
given her type. Let θµ be the lowest valuation which is higher than the mean. The
highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with a valuation lower than θµ is her valuation. The
subjective maximin belief of such a bidder about the other bidders’ valuation distributions
is that the probability weight is distributed between her own valuation and θµ. As a
consequence, a bidder with a valuation lower than θµ expects a utility of zero and is
indifferent between any bid between zero and her valuation. Every bidder with valuation θ
such that θ ≥ θµ never expects to win against a bidder with the same valuation. Hence, the
subjective maximin belief of such a bidder about the other bidders’ valuation distribution
maximizes the probability weight on θ and makes the bidder indifferent between any
highest rationalizable bid of lower types. As a consequence, the bidder mixes among all
highest rationalizable bids of lower types. Therefore, the outcome is not efficient.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I conclude the introduction with
an overview over the related literature. The second section contains the formal description
of the proposed decision criterion. In the third section I collect sufficient conditions for
actions to be rationalizable which will be useful for the derivation of subjective maximin
beliefs and outcomes under maximin strategies. Moreover, I provide sufficient conditions
for the existence of such outcomes. In the fourth section I apply the decision criterion
to first-price auctions under strategic uncertainty. The fifth section contains the formal
description of the decision criterion under distributional and strategic uncertainty and
its application to first-price auctions. The appendix contains the proofs not provided in
previous sections.
Relation to the literature
This paper relates to two strands of literature - the literature on decision criteria under
uncertainty and robustness and the literature on rationalizability. Two widely used
decision criteria under uncertainty are the maximin utility and the minimax regret criterion.
The axiomatization of the maximin expected utility criterion is provided in Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989), the axiomatization of the minimax regret criterion is provided in Stoye
(2011). In Bergemann and Schlag (2008) both criteria are applied to a monopoly pricing
problem where a seller faces uncertainty about the buyer’s valuation distribution. Since
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the seller knows that the buyer will obtain the good if the price is equal or lower than her
valuation, the seller does not face strategic uncertainty.
The maximin expected utility criterion has been applied to first-price auctions under
distributional uncertainty. Lo (1998) derives Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding strategies
in a first-price auction under the maximin expected utility criterion where it is common
knowledge that the true valuation distribution is an element of a given set of distributions.
Salo and Weber (1995) assume that only the set of possible valuations is common knowledge
and that ambiguity averse bidders use a convex transformation of the uniform distribution
as a prior. They find, that the more ambiguity averse a bidder is, the higher is the bid.
Chen et al. (2007) analyze first- and second-price auctions where bidders face one of two
possible distributions which can be ordered with respect to first-order stochastic dominance.
Thus, an ambiguity-averse bidder would assume the stochastically dominating distribution.
In their experimental findings they reject the hypothesis that bidders are ambiguity-averse.
These three papers use Bayes-Nash equilibria as a solution concept, that is, the issue of
strategic uncertainty is not addressed.
Bose et al. (2006) derive the optimal auction in a setting where seller and bidders
may face different degrees of ambiguity, that is, they may face different sets of possible
valuation distributions. Carrasco et al. (2018) consider a seller facing a single buyer. The
set of distributions the seller considers to be possible is determined by a given support and
mean. In these two papers strategic uncertainty is not an issue since the seller chooses a
strategy proof direct mechanism.
Renou and Schlag (2010) analyze strategic uncertainty using the minimax regret
criterion. Besides Kasberger and Schlag (2017), I am the only one addressing distributional
and strategic uncertainty. They use the minimax regret criterion and allow for the
possibility that a bidder can impose bounds on the other bidders’ bids or valuation
distributions. For example, they consider the case where a bidder can impose a lower
bound on the highest bid.
In their literature on robust mechanism design Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
consider the problem of a social planner facing uncertainty about the players’ actions.
In Bergemann and Morris (2005) a social planner can circumvent uncertainty about the
players’ strategies by choosing ex-post implementable mechanisms. Bergemann and Morris
(2013) provide predictions in games independent of the specification of the information
structure. In order to do so, they characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. An
application of this concept to first-price auctions is carried out in Bergemann et al. (2017).
In Carroll (2016) two agents accept or reject a proposed deal where the valuation for each
agent depends on an unknown state. The main result provides an upper bound of welfare
loss among all information structures.
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The concept of rationalizable strategies has been first introduced by Bernheim (1984)
and Pearce (1984) for games with complete information. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003b)
extend rationalizability to games of incomplete information. An application to first-price
auctions has been carried out by Dekel and Wolinsky (2001). They apply rationalizable
strategies to a first-price auction with discrete private valuations and discrete bids. They
present a condition on the distribution of types under which the only rationalizable action
is to bid the highest bid below valuation. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003a) assume that
valuation distributions in a first-price auction are common knowledge but not the strategies
of the bidders. They characterize the set of rationalizable actions under the assumption of
strategic sophistication, which implies common knowledge of rationality and of the fact
that bidders with positive bids win with positive probability. They find that for a bidder
with a given valuation θ all bids in an interval (0, bmax (θ)) are rationalizable where bmax (θ)
is higher than the Bayes-Nash equilibrium bid. Using this result, one can immediately
tell that under common knowledge of rationality a bidder applying the maximin expected
utility criterion has the subjective maximin belief that every other bidder with valuation
θ bids bmax (θ). I replicate this result in section 4 for first-price auctions with discrete
valuations.
To the best of my knowledge I am the first one applying the maximin expected utility
criterion to strategic uncertainty and the first one combining rationalizable strategies with
a decision criterion under uncertainty.
2 Model
Underlying game of incomplete information The starting point of the model is a
game of incomplete information which is denoted by
({1, . . . , I},Θ, A, {ui}i∈{1,...,I}) where
{1, . . . , I} is the set of players and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, Ai ⊆ R is the set of possible
actions and Θi ⊆ R is the set of possible privately known types of player i. A and Θ are
defined by A = A1 × . . . × AI and Θ = Θ1 × . . . × ΘI . A pure strategy of player i is a
mapping
βi : Θi → Ai
θi 7→ ai.
The set Si is the set of all pure strategies of player i. A strategy of player i is a mapping
βi : Θi → ∆Ai
θi 7→ ai
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where ∆Ai is the set of probability distributions on Ai. In the following g
βi
θi
will denote
the density of the bid distribution βi (θi) and supp (βi (θi)) its support.
4 Let
ui : A×Θi → R
(a1, . . . , aI , θi) 7→ ui (a1, . . . , aI , θi)
denote the utility function of player i. That is, I consider a setting with private valuations.
For a given profile of strategies (β1, . . . , βn) and a given type distribution
F : Θ→ [0, 1]
the expected utility of a player i is given by
Ui (θi, βi (θi) , β−i, F−i)
=
∫
θ−i
∫
a−i
ui (a1, . . . , ai, . . . , aI , θi)
∏
j 6=i
g
βj
θj
(aj) dθ−jdF−i (θ−i) dθ−i (1)
where the function ui stems from the underlying game of incomplete information and
where F−i is defined by F−i (θ−i) = F (θ−i, θi).5
Action space of adverse nature In order to formalize the maximin expected utility
criterion, a new player, denoted by n, is introduced, representing the adverse nature
a player i applying the maximin expected utility criterion faces. Players i and n play
a simultaneous zero-sum game where utilities are induced by the underlying game of
incomplete information. The first step of a formal description of this game is the definition
of the adverse nature’s action space. It accounts for the residual uncertainty of player i.
In sections 2-4 I study only strategic uncertainty and assume common knowledge of a type
distribution given by
F : Θ→ [0, 1].
That is, the adverse nature’s action space is the set of all other players’ strategies
which player i considers to be possible which is the set of rationalizable strategies.
4A pure strategy can be interpreted as distribution of bids which puts probability weight 1 on one bid.
I abuse notation since in the case of a pure strategy, βi (θi) denotes an element in Ai while in the case of
a (mixed) strategy βi (θi) denotes an element in ∆Ai. However, in the following it will be clear whether
βi is a pure or a mixed strategy.
5For a vector (v1, . . . , vI) I denote by v−i the vector (v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vI).
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Rationalizable strategies As argued in the introduction, in many economic settings
players may face uncertainty about the other players’ strategies. Even if a (Bayes-) Nash
equilibrium exists, a player may consider also other strategies of her opponents to be
possible. For example, multiple Nash equilibria can exist or the Nash equilibrium strategies
are not aligned with preferences the other players may have, e.g. maximin or minimax
regret preferences. In order to determine the set of strategies a player can expect from
rational opponents, I assume common knowledge of rationality. That is, it is common
knowledge that every player i maximizes her expected utility given her type, the commonly
known type distribution F and a conjecture about the other players’ strategies.
The assumption of common knowledge of rationality leads to the following reasoning.
Every player i maximizes her expected utility given her type, the type distribution F and
a conjecture about the other players’ strategies. The strategy which player i assumes
is played by some player j 6= i has also to be compatible with common knowledge of
rationality. Therefore, for every possible type of player j, the action prescribed by the
strategy assumed by player i maximizes j’s expected utility given her type, the type
distribution F and a conjecture about the other players’ strategies. Again, player j’s
conjecture has to be compatible with common knowledge of rationality. This reasoning
continues ad infinitum. 6
Given the type of a player, an action which is compatible with common knowledge of
rationality is called rationalizable. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003b) have shown that it is
equivalent to define a rationalizable action as follows.
Definition 1. ggggg
(i) Let i ∈ {1, . . . , I} be a player and θi ∈ Θi be a type of player i. The set of
rationalizable actions for player i is defined as follows. Set RS1i (θi) := Ai. Assume
that for k ∈ N the set RSki (θi) is already defined. Then the set RSk+1i (θi) is defined
as the set of all elements ai in Ai for which there exists a strategy profile β−i of the
other players such that it holds
(i) aj ∈ supp (βj (θj)) for θj ∈ Θj ⇒ aj ∈ RSkj (θj) for all j 6= i
(ii) ai ∈ argmax
a′i∈Ai
Ui (θi, a
′
i, β−i, F−i)
6As stated above, under strategic uncertainty a rational player acts optimally given a conjecture
about the other players’ strategies (and a conjecture about the other players’ type distributions if also
distributional uncertainty is present). Instead of “conjecture” other terms have been used in economic
literature, e.g. belief, subjective prior, assumption, assessment ect. I use the term conjecture as proposed
in Bernheim (1984).
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and RSi (θi) is given by
RSi (θi) =
⋂
k≥1
RSki (θi) .
(ii) A strategy βi of a player i is rationalizable if for every θi ∈ Θi every action ai with
ai ∈ supp (βi(θi)) is rationalizable, i.e. an element of RSi (θi).
(iii) For a player i let RS−i be the set of rationalizable strategies of the other I−1 players.
The intuition behind this definition is that an action for a player which is consistent
with common knowledge of rationality, i.e. a rationalizable action, is an action which
survives the iterated elimination of actions which are not best replies. An action is a best
reply if it maximizes the player’s expected utility given her type, the commonly known
type distribution F and a conjecture about the other players’ strategies which prescribe
actions that have not been eliminated yet.
The definition of rationalizable strategies allows for a formal definition of the adverse
nature’s action space and therefore for a formal definition of the simultaneous game against
the adverse nature.
Simultaneous game against adverse nature The following definition summarizes
all components describing a game under strategic uncertainty.
Definition 2. A game under strategic uncertainty consists of an underlying game
of incomplete information, denoted by ({1, . . . , I},Θ, A, {ui}i ∈ {1, . . . , I}), a subset of
players {i1, . . . ik} ⊆ {1, . . . , I} applying the maximin expected utility criterion, and a
player n. For every i ∈ {i1, . . . , ik} player i chooses a strategy
βi : Θi → ∆Ai.
A strategy of n is a mapping which for every player i ∈ {i1, . . . ik} and for every possible
type of player i assigns a strategy of the other players:
βn = (β
ni1 , . . . , βnik ) : Θi1 × . . .×Θik → RS−i1 × · · · ×RS−ik .
(θi1 , . . . , θik)→
(
β
ni1 ,θi1
−i1 , . . . , β
nik ,θik
−ik
)
.
Here the superscript nij , θij for j ∈ {1, . . . , k} indicates that the other players’ strategies
β
nij ,θij
−ij are chosen by the adverse nature faced by player ij and depend on the player’s type
θij . The utility of a player i ∈ {i1, . . . , ik} is given by
Ui
(
θi, βi (θi) , β
ni,θi
−i , F−i
)
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which is defined as in (1) and depends on the utility function of player i in the underlying
game of incomplete information, denoted by ui:
ui : A×Θi → R.
(a1, . . . , aI , θi) 7→ ui (a1, . . . , aI , θi) .
The utility of player nature is given by
−
k∑
j=1
Ui
(
θi, βi (θi) , β
ni,θi
−i , F−i
)
.
Throughout the remainder of the paper it will be assumed that a game under strategic
uncertainty is given without explicitly stating all its ingredients.
Since the other players’ strategies the adverse nature chooses for a player i ∈ {i1, . . . , ik},
are not observed by a player j 6= i, j ∈ {i1, . . . , ik}, the adverse nature faces an independent
minimization problem for every player applying the expected maximin utility criterion.7
Note that after specifying the subset of players who apply the maximin expected utility
criterion, a given game of incomplete information uniquely defines a game under strategic
uncertainty.
Now it is possible to define a maximin strategy in a game under strategic uncertainty
which can be seen as a recommendation for a player facing strategic uncertainty.
Definition 3. In a game under strategic uncertainty for a player i a strategy
βi : Θi → ∆Ai
is a maximin strategy if there exists a Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous game between
nature and player i such that βi is player i’s equilibrium strategy.
The Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous game between nature and player i is called
maximin equilibrium.
As described above, such a maximin strategy has two properties. First, if a player
would not choose an action according to a maximin strategy, then there would exist a
rationalizable strategy of the other players under which the player’s expected utility is
lower than under the action prescribed by a maximin strategy. Second, the strategy chosen
by nature can be interpreted as the player’s subjective belief about the state of the world
7Equivalently, one could introduce an additional adverse nature for every player applying the minimax
expected utility criterion.
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against which she maximizes her expected utility given her type. The second property is
formalized in the following definition.
Definition 4. In a game under strategic uncertainty let βni be the adverse nature’s
maximin equilibrium strategy projected on the i′th component. A subjective maximin belief
of player i with valuation θi is defined as
βni (θi) = β
ni,θi
−i ,
that is, the adverse nature’s maximin equilibrium strategy evaluated at θi.
Note that the subjective maximin belief of player is not necessarily unique. However,
every best reply of a player i to any subjective maximin belief induces the same expected
utility for player i.
3 Outcomes under strategic uncertainty
So far, I have characterized the set of strategies of a player which are obtained if this
particular player applies the maximin expected utility criterion. In addition to the
derivation of maximin strategies for particular players, one can analyze what happens if
all players adopt maximin strategies. Since under strategic uncertainty players do not
observe each other’s strategies, I do not use the term equilibrium, but the term outcome.
Definition 5. In a game under strategic uncertainty an outcome under maximin strategies
is a strategy profile (β1, . . . , βI , βn) such that for every i ∈ {1, . . . , I} it holds that player
i’s strategy is a maximin strategy given the adverse nature’s strategy βn.
In other words, for every player i ∈ {1, . . . , I} it holds that (β1, . . . , βI , βn) constitutes
a maximin equilibrium in the simultaneous game between all players and the adverse
nature. The following Proposition follows from the definition of rationalizable strategies
and of an outcome under maximin strategies.
Proposition 1. In a game under strategic uncertainty let (β1, . . . , βI , βn) be an outcome
under maximin strategies. Then for every i ∈ {1, . . . , I} it holds that βi is a rationalizable
strategy for player i.
One can prove this Proposition by showing per induction that for every k ∈ N, for
every θi ∈ Θi and for every ai ∈ supp (βi(θi)) it holds that ai is an element in RSki (θi).
The formal proof is relegated to Appendix A.
14
The following conclusions can be derived from this proposition. First, this proposition
shows that the maximin expected utility criterion is consistent with common knowledge
of rationality. That is, every action resulting from the application of the maximin utility
criterion is rationalizable. Second, it provides a sufficient condition for a strategy to be
rationalizable which will be useful in subsequent proofs. Third, the same proof as for
Proposition 1 can be used in order to show that an action which is a best reply to a
rationalizable strategy is again rationalizable. The last statement is formalized in the
following Corollary.
Corollary 1. In a game under strategic uncertainty let i ∈ {1, . . . , I} be a player with
valuation θi and for every j ∈ {1, . . . , I}\{i} let βj be a rationalizable strategy for player
j. Let ai ∈ Ai be a best reply to β−i, i.e. it holds that
ai ∈ argmax
a′i∈Ai
Ui (θi, a
′
i, β−i, F−i) ,
then ai ∈ RSi (θi), that is, ai is a rationalizable action for player i with valuation θi.
Another sufficient condition for an action to be rationalizable is that it is played in a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium. It follows from Corollary 1 that a best reply to strategies played
in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium is rationalizable. This constitutes another sufficient condition
for an action to be rationalizable. These two conditions are formalized in the following
definition and proposition.
Definition 6. In a game of incomplete information a strategy profile (β1, . . . βI) together
with a profile of type distributions
(
Fˆ1, . . . , FˆI
)
is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium with a common
prior if for every i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, every θi ∈ Θi and every ai ∈ Ai such that ai ∈ supp (βi (θi))
it holds that
ai ∈ argmax
a′i∈Ai
Ui
(
θi, a
′
i, β−i, Fˆ−i
)
.
That is, every player maximizes her expected utility given the other players’ strategies and
the other players’ commonly known type distributions.
Proposition 2. Let the profile of strategies (β1, . . . , βI) together with the profile of type
distributions
(
Fˆ1, . . . , FˆI
)
constitute a Bayes-Nash equilibrium with a common prior of a
game of incomplete information. Then the following holds true:
(i) For every i ∈ {1, . . . , I} the strategy βi is rationalizable.
(ii) Let i ∈ {1, . . . I} be a player with valuation θi and let ai ∈ Ai be a best reply to β−i
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and some distribution of the other players’ types F−i′ ∈ ∆Θ−i, i.e. it holds that
ai ∈ argmax
a′i∈Ai
Ui
(
θi, a
′
i, β−i, F
′
−i
)
,
then ai ∈ RSi (θi), that is, ai is a rationalizable action for player i with valuation θi.
The formal proof is relegated to Appendix B.
As mentioned above, for every player applying the maximin expected utility criterion,
the adverse nature faces an independent optimization problem. Thus, if {i1, . . . , ik} is the
set of players applying the maximin expected utility criterion, then the game against an
adverse nature can be seen as k independent two-player zero-sum games. This allows for
the application of all results for two-player zero-sum games including the existence result
for Nash equilibria.
4 First-Price Auctions under Strategic uncertainty
In this section I apply the proposed decision criterion to first-price auctions. The first
subsection specifies the model for first-price auctions. The second subsection gives a rather
informal preview of the results. The third subsection provides a list of the necessary
notation and definitions. The fourth and fifth subsection contain a detailed description and
derivation of the results for first price auctions under strategic uncertainty with common
knowledge of valuations and common knowledge of the valuation distribution, respectively.
4.1 Model
Underlying game of incomplete information As in the general model, the model
description starts with the specification of the underlying game of incomplete information.
There are I risk-neutral bidders competing in a first-price sealed-bid auction for one
indivisible good. Before the auction starts, every bidder i ∈ {1, ..., I} privately observes
her valuation (type) θi ∈ Θ = {0 = θ1, θ2, . . . , θm−1, 1 = θm}. A pure strategy of bidder i
is a mapping
βi : Θ→ B
θi 7→ βi(θi)
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where B is a finite (arbitrarily fine) grid of bids on an interval [0, B] with Θ ⊆ B.8 A
strategy of a bidder i is a mapping
βi : Θ→ ∆B
θi 7→ βi (θi)
where ∆B is the set of bid distributions on B. For every b ∈ B with b > 0 there exists a
predecessor in B denoted by
b− = max
b′∈B
b′ < b
and for every b ∈ B with b < B there exists a successor in B denoted by
b+ = min
b′∈B
b′ > b.
In a first-price auction the bidders submit bids, the bidder with the highest bid wins
the object and pays her bid. In addition, it holds an efficient tie-breaking rule.9 Thus, the
utility of bidder i with valuation θi and bid bi given that the other bids are b−i is denoted
by
ui (θi, bi, b−i) =

θi − bi if bi > max
j 6=i
bj
θi − bi if bi = max
j 6=i
bj and θi > max
j 6=i
{θj | bj = bi}
0 if bi = max
j 6=i
bj and θi < max
j 6=i
{θj | bj = bi}
1
k
(θi − bi) if bi = max
j 6=i
bj and θi = max
j 6=i
{θj | bj = bi}
0 if bi < max
j 6=i
bj
where θj denotes the valuation of bidder j with bid bj for j ∈ {1, ..., n} and k =
#{max{θj|bj = bi}}.
The bidders’ valuations are identically and independently distributed according to a
distribution function
F : Θ→ [0, 1].
8A finite grid is used for the set of all possible bids instead of the interval [0, B] because of the following
reason. Consider two bidders 1 and 2 with the same valuation θ. If bidder 1 bids some amount b < θ, one
has to identify the smallest bid which is strictly higher than b since this would be the unique best reply of
bidder 2. This allows a more formal analysis than using expressions like ”bidding an arbitrarily small
amount more than b”. The grid is assumed to be finite in order to ensure that any subset of the bid grid
is compact. Since the grid can be arbitrarily fine, I assume for simplicity that Θ ⊆ B.
9The core statements in the results do not depend on the choice of the tie-breaking rule, i.e. under a
random tie-breaking rule for every bidder and every valuation the bid prescribed by the maximin strategy
would change by at most one step on the bid grid.
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It is assumed that all components of the underlying game of incomplete information as
well as rationality are common knowledge among all bidders.
As mentioned above, the above defined game of incomplete information uniquely defines
a game under strategic uncertainty (after specifying the players applying the maximin
expected utility criterion). In the following I will call this game first-price auction under
strategic uncertainty. Moreover, I also consider the case where the valuations of the bidders
are common knowledge. In this case I use the term first-price auction under strategic
uncertainty and common knowledge of valuations.
4.2 Preview of results
Common knowledge of valuations If in a first-price auction under strategic uncertainty
and common knowledge of valuations there exists a unique bidder with the highest valuation,
this bidder’s maximin strategy is to bid the second-highest valuation and every other
bidder’s maximin strategy prescribes to be indifferent between any bid between zero and
her valuation. If at least two bidders have the highest valuation, then every bidder’s
maximin strategy prescribes to be indifferent between zero and her valuation.
Common knowledge of the valuation distribution In a first-price auction under
strategic uncertainty the bidders’ strategies are equal in every outcome under maximin
strategies and every outcome is efficient.
For every type there exists a unique highest rationalizable bid. For every bidder and
every type the adverse nature chooses as the strategy of the other bidders that every
bidder places the highest rationalizable bid given her type. As a consequence, a bidder
applying the maximin expected utility criterion never expects to win against a bidder
with an equal or higher type. The bidder calculates which highest rationalizable bid of
a lower type maximizes her expected utility. It turns out that due to the symmetry of
beliefs about distributions and strategies, the higher the type of the bidder, the higher is
the type whose highest rationalizable bid maximizes her expected utility. Therefore, every
outcome under maximin strategies is efficient.
4.3 Notation and definitions
For the formal analysis it is useful to have an overview over the notation and definitions
which will be used in the remainder of this paper.
• For θk ∈ Θ let bθk be the highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation θk.
18
• For θk, θl ∈ Θ, f i,θk
j,θl
denotes the probability with which type θl of bidder j occurs in
the subjective maximin belief of a bidder i with valuation θk.
• If f i,θk
j,θl
does not depend on the identities of bidder i and j, I use the notation f θ
k
θl
.
Definition 7. An auction mechanism is a double (x, p) of an allocation function x and a
payment function p. The allocation function
x : (B)I → [0, 1]I
x : (b1, . . . , bI)→ (x1, . . . , xI) with xi ∈ [0, 1],
∑
xi ≤ 1
determines for each participant the probability of receiving the item and the payment
function
p : (B)I → (R+)I
p : (b1, . . . , bI)→ (p1, . . . , pI) with pi ∈ R+
determines each participant’s payment.
Definition 8. In a first-price auction a bidder i with valuation θi and strategy βi overbids
a bidder j with valuation θj and strategy βj if for every b, b
′ such that b ∈ supp (βi(θi))
and b′ ∈ supp(βj (θj)) it holds that b ≥ b′ if θi > θj and b > b′ if θi ≤ θj.
Note that due to the efficient tie-breaking rule, a bidder who overbids every other
bidder wins with probability 1 in any auction mechanism where the highest bid wins.
In order to evaluate outcomes in terms of social surplus, I introduce the following
definition.
Definition 9. Let (β1, . . . , βI , βn) be an outcome under maximin strategies of an auction
mechanism. The outcome (β1, . . . , βI , βn) is efficient if for all bid vectors (b1, . . . , bI), such
that for every i ∈ {1, . . . I} there exists a valuation θi with bi ∈ supp(βi(θi)), it holds that
xi (b1, . . . , bI) > 0 ⇒ θi = max
j 6=i
θj.
That is, the good is allocated with probability one to a group of bidders who have the highest
valuation.
4.4 Common knowledge of valuations
Proposition 3. Consider a first-price auction under strategic uncertainty and common
knowledge of valuations. Then there exists an outcome under maximin strategies and the
following holds true:
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(i) If θk > max
j 6=i
θj, i.e. there exists a unique bidder k with the highest valuation, then
bidder k bids θk′ = max
θj∈Θ\{θk}
θj, i.e. the bidder with the highest valuation bids the
second-highest valuation and every bidder i 6= k is indifferent between any bid between
zero and her valuation.
(ii) If it holds that θk = θl = max
j∈{1,...,I}
θj, i.e. there exist at least two bidders k and l with
the highest valuation, then every bidder is indifferent between any bid between zero
and her valuation.
The formal proof is relegated to Appendix C.
The intuition behind part (i) is that one can show that the second-highest valuation θk′
is the highest rationalizable bid of bidder k with the highest valuation θk. If the adverse
nature chooses for all other bidders the subjective maximin belief that bidder k bids θk′ ,
this induces a utility of zero for any other bidder. Hence, any strategy of the adverse
nature has to induce an expected utility of at most zero for all bidders besides k. That is,
the subjective maximin belief of a bidder i 6= k with valuation θi is that at least one other
bidder bids an amount which is equal or greater than θi. As a consequence, all bidders are
indifferent between zero and their valuation. The adverse nature chooses the subjective
maximin belief for bidder k such that the bidder with the second-highest valuation bids
her valuation θk′ . Hence, it is a best reply for bidder k to bid θk′ . Similar arguments apply
to part (ii).
This Proposition describes the bidding behavior in a first-price auction under strategic
uncertainty under the assumption that every bidder applies the proposed decision criterion.
Since the bidders do not best reply to each other’s strategies, the Proposition also provides
the maximin strategy for every bidder. That is, the strategy prescribed in the outcome
also serves as a recommendation for a bidder facing strategic uncertainty in a first-price
auction.
Note that while the unique Nash equilibrium in this setting is rationalizable, there are
much more rationalizable actions than played in the Nash equilibrium. In particular, in
the case of two bidders who have the same valuation v all actions in the interval [0, v] are
rationalizable. This leaves room for more outcomes than the unique Nash-equilibrium
which is weakly dominated.
4.5 Common knowledge of the valuation distribution
Now I consider the case where not the bidders’ valuations but the distribution of the
valuations is common knowledge. In this case in an outcome under maximin strategies for
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every type there exists a unique highest rationalizable bid. For every bidder and every
type the adverse nature chooses as the strategy of the other bidders that every other
bidder will bid the highest rationalizable bid given her type. As a consequence, it is never
a best reply for a bidder to overbid bidders with the same type. Hence, every bidder
overbids only lower types and it depends on the commonly known valuation distribution
which types are overbid. Since the strategy chosen by the adverse nature is the same for
every bidder and every type, this results in an efficient outcome. This is illustrated by the
following example.
Example 1. Consider a first-price auction under strategic uncertainty with two bidders
1 and 2 and three possible valuations 0, θ and 1 which are identically and independently
distributed according to a commonly known distribution function F ∈ ∆{0, θ, 1}. For
every type θk ∈ {0, θ, 1} there exists a highest rationalizable bid bθk . For every bidder and
every type the adverse nature chooses a strategy of the other bidder to bid the highest
rationalizable bid given her type. That is, every bidder with every type has the subjective
maximin belief that the 0-type bids zero, the θ-type bids b
θ
and the 1-type bids b
1
.
b
θ θ0 b
1 1
Hence, bidder 1 with type θ never expects to win against bidder 2 with type θ and
therefore bids 0. Bidder 1 with type 1 never expects to win against bidder 2 with type 1
and has to decide between bidding 0 and bidding b
θ
. Since the same reasoning holds for
bidder 2, in any case the outcome is efficient.
The insights from this example are formalized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4. In a first-price auction under strategic uncertainty there exists an outcome
under maximin strategies. Every outcome is efficient.
The formal proof is relegated to Appendix D.
I will show the existence of an efficient outcome under maximin strategies by construction.
Then I will show that every strategy of the adverse nature in an outcome under maximin
strategies induces the same bidding strategies as in the constructed outcome and therefore
every outcome has to be efficient. The proof by construction has the advantage that it
determines the maximin strategies for every bidder, i.e. it provides a recommendation for
a bidder facing strategic uncertainty.
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For the construction of the efficient outcome it is crucial to calculate the highest
rationalizable bid for every type. The following three steps serve as a preparation for this
calculation.
(I) Show that for every type θk ∈ Θ there exists a unique highest rationalizable bid bθk .
(II) Show that for every type zero is a rationalizable bid.
(III) Show that for every type θk ∈ Θ every bid in the interval [0, bθk ] is rationalizable.
The first step follows from the fact that B is compact and well-ordered with respect
to ≤. For a proof sketch of step (II) consider a proof by induction with respect to the
valuations in Θ. Assume it has been shown that for every bidder with valuation θj such
that j < k+ 1 bidding zero is a rationalizable action. Assume that a bidder with valuation
θk+1 conjectures that all lower types bid zero. Due to step (I), for every type there exists a
highest rationalizable bid. Assume further, that the bidder with valuation θk+1 conjectures
that all equal or higher types bid their highest rationalizable bid, then it is a best reply of
this bidder to bid zero. As stated in Corollary 1, a best reply to a rationalizable strategy
profile is rationalizable and therefore zero is a rationalizable action for a bidder with
valuation θk+1.
For an intuition of step (III) consider the bid 0+. Since bidding zero is a rationalizable
action for every bidder and every type, it is straight-forward that for a sufficiently fine
bid grid bidding 0+ is a rationalizable action for every bidder and every type besides zero.
Because if a bidder conjectures that all bidders bid zero, than she could win the auction
with probability 1 by bidding 0+. The same holds for (0+)
+
and so on. This process
reaches some bid b such that for type θ2 it is more profitable to bid zero and win against
the zero-type than to bid b+ even if all other bidders with a type higher than zero bid b.
Then b is the highest rationalizable bid for type θ2 and all bids in the interval [0, b] are
rationalizable for a bidder with valuation θ2. The analogous reasoning applies to every
higher type. Since the bids in B are well-ordered with respect to ≤, one can show the
result by double induction with respect to the types and the bids.
Given these steps, one can calculate the highest rationalizable bid for every type. The
highest rationalizable bid b
θk
for a bidder i with valuation θk is induced by the belief about
the other bidders’ strategies such that
(i) All bidders with a lower type bid their highest rationalizable bid.
(ii) All bidders with an equal or higher type bid
(
b
θk
)−
.
22
That is, b
θk
is a best reply to the belief which maximizes the expected utility of bidding
b
θk
. The strategies in (i) are rationalizable by definition and it follows from step (III) that
the strategies specified in (ii) are rationalizable. Hence, the highest rationalizable bid b
θk
of type θk makes this type indifferent between winning with probability 1 by bidding b
θk
and the most profitable overbidding of a lower type given that all lower types bid their
highest rationalizable bid.
In an outcome under maximin strategies for every bidder and every type the adverse
nature chooses as the strategy of the other bidders that every other bidder places the
highest rationalizable bid given her type. As a consequence, a bidder never expects to win
against an equal or higher type. The maximin strategy of a bidder is determined by the
most profitable overbidding of a lower type given that every lower type places her highest
rationalizable bid.
The following example continues with Example 1 and illustrates the calculation of the
highest rationalizable bids and the maximin strategies.
Example 2. Consider again the case with two bidders 1 and 2 and three possible valuations
0,θ and 1 which are identically and independently distributed according to a commonly
known distribution function F ∈ ∆{0, θ, 1}.
b
θ θ0 b
1 1
The highest rationalizable bid for type zero is zero. The highest rationalizable bid for type
θ is given by the bid b
θ
which makes her indifferent between winning with probability 1 by
bidding b
θ
and just overbidding type zero:
θ − bθ = F (0) (θ − 0)
⇔ bθ = θ (1− F (0)) + F (0) .
The highest rationalizable bid for type 1 is given by the bid b
1
which makes her indifferent
between winning with probability 1 by bidding b
1
and the most profitable overbidding of
a lower type. That is, type 1 has to be indifferent between bidding b
1
and the maximum
utility of bidding either 0 = b
0
or b
θ
:
1− b1 = max
{
F (0) (1− 0) , F (θ)
(
1− bθ
)}
.
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For a numerical example consider the parameters θ = 1
2
, F (0) = 1
3
, F (θ) = 2
3
and
F (1) = 1. Then it holds that
b
θ
=
1
2
(
1− 1
3
)
=
1
3
and
max
{
F (0) , F (θ)
(
1− bθ
)}
= max
{
1
3
,
2
3
(
1− 1
3
)}
=
4
9
= F (θ)
(
1− bθ
)
from which follows that
b
1
= 1− 4
9
=
5
9
which is illustrated below:
b
θ
= 1
3
θ0 b
1
= 5
9
1
After computing the highest rationalizable bids, one can compute bidding strategies in an
outcome under maximin strategies. Type zero bids zero. Note that the highest rationalizable
bid of type θ is determined by the case that type θ wins with probability 1. Since type θ of
bidder 1 has the subjective maximin belief that type θ of bidder 2 bids b
θ
, bidder 1 would
win only with probability 1
2
by bidding b
θ
. Hence, given the subjective maximin of bidder 1
with type θ, it is not a best reply to bid equal or higher than b
θ
. Therefore, she does not
expect to win against type θ of bidder 2 and bids zero. Similarly, type 1 of bidder 1 does
not expect to win against type 1 of bidder 2 and has to decide whether to overbid type 0
or type θ of bidder 2, i.e. whether to bid 0 or b
θ
. In any case the outcome is efficient.10
Bidding zero gives an expected utility of
F (0) =
1
3
and bidding b
θ
= 1
3
gives an expected utility of
F (θ)
(
1− bθ
)
=
2
3
(
1− 1
3
)
=
4
9
.
Hence, type 1 of bidder 1 will bid b
θ
(and analogously for type θ of bidder 2).
10Due to the efficient tie-breaking rule the outcome is efficient even if different types submit equal bids.
However, efficiency does not depend on thy choice of the tie-breaking rule. Under a random tie-breaking
rule type 1 would just decide between the bids 0+ and
(
b
θ
)+
.
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Applying the same procedure, one can compute the highest rationalizable bids for every
number of types and every choice of parameters and then compute the bids under maximin
strategies. The following two graphs show the highest rationalizable bids for m equidistant
types with a uniform distribution for m = 10 and m = 20.
Figure 1: Highest rationalizable bids for m = 10
Figure 2: Highest rationalizable bids for m = 20
The following two graphs show the bids in an outcome under maximin strategies for m
equidistant types with a uniform distribution for m = 10 and m = 20.
Figure 3: Bids in an outcome under maximin strategies for m = 10
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Figure 4: Bids in an outcome under maximin strategies for m = 20
Figures 3 and 4 show that the outcome under maximin strategies is efficient since
the bidder with the highest valuation wins the auction with probability 1. However, it
is possible that different types submit equal bids. Whenever a bidder is not indifferent
between two bids, her bidding strategy is unique which is the case in figures 3 and 4.
The strategy of the adverse nature is not necessarily unique. Assume that it is a best
reply of a bidder i with valuation θk ∈ Θ to bid bθl for l < k. Then it is possible that
the adverse nature decreases the bid of some bidder j 6= i with type θl′ for l 6= l′ without
changing the best reply of bidder i and hence without changing her expected utility.
Since all possible strategies of the adverse nature induce the same bidding strategies, the
non-uniqueness of the adverse nature’s strategy does not affect efficiency.
The recursive computation of the highest rationalizable bids for all types is formalized
in the following Proposition.
Proposition 5. In a first-price auction under strategic uncertainty the highest rationalizable
bids can be defined by the following recursion. The highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with
valuation zero is zero. Assume that for every type θj with j < k the highest rationalizable
bid b
θj
has been already defined. Then the highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with
valuation θk is determined by the equality
θk − bθk = max
θj<θk
F I−1
(
θj
) (
θk − bθj
)
. (2)
The formal proof is relegated to Appendix D.11
Proposition 5 states that the highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation θk
makes this bidder indifferent between winning the auction with probability 1 by bidding
11For a simpler notation I assume that the highest rationalizable bids b
θj
for 1 ≤ j ≤ m lie on the
bid grid. Otherwise, the highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation θk would be defined by
max{b ∈ B | b < bθk} where the bid bθk is defined by bθ
k
= θk − bθk = max
θj<θk
F I−1
(
θj
)(
θk − bθ
j
)
.
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b
θk
and the most profitable overbidding of some lower type given that all lower types bid
their highest rationalizable bid.
After calculating the highest rationalizable bid for every type, one can specify the
strategies played in an outcome under maximin strategies.
Proposition 6. In a first-price auction under strategic uncertainty it holds for every
outcome under maximin strategies and for every bidder i and every valuation θk that
b ∈ supp (βi (θk))⇒ b ∈ argmax
b
θj
{
F I−1
(
θj
) (
θk − bθj
) ∣∣ θj < θk} .
This proposition states that every bidder chooses the most profitable overbidding of a
lower type. The intuition for this result is as follows. I show in the proof of Proposition
4 that there exists an outcome under maximin strategies such that for every bidder the
adverse nature chooses as the other bidders’ strategy that every bidder places the highest
rationalizable bid given her type. The strategy specified in Proposition 6 is a best reply to
this strategy of the adverse nature. Moreover, I show in the proof of Proposition 4 that in
every outcome under maximin strategies of a first-price auction under strategic uncertainty
the bidders’ strategies are equal. Therefore, in every outcome the bidders’ strategies are
as specified in Proposition 6. The formal proof is relegated to Appendix D. Note that as
before, this Proposition also provides the maximin strategy, i.e. a recommendation, for a
bidder facing strategic uncertainty in a first-price auction.
Proposition 6 shows that a bidder with a given type does not need to know the exact
value or distribution of higher types but only of lower types. This stems from the fact
that a bidder with a given type does not expect to win against bidders with the same or a
higher type. This Proposition also provides an intuition for the fact that every outcome is
efficient. The higher the valuation of a bidder, the higher is the type such that bidding
the highest rationalizable bid of this type maximizes the bidder’s expected utility.
Similarly as in the case where bidders’ valuations are known, there are more rationalizable
actions than actions played in the Bayes-Nash equilibrium as formalized in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 7. Consider a first-price auction under strategic uncertainty. Let b
θk
∗ =
max supp
(
β∗
(
θk
))
in the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium β∗.12 If m ≥ 3, it holds for all
k 6= 1 that bθk∗ < b
θk
.
Proof. The formal proof is relegated to Appendix E.
12It follows from Montiero (2009) that a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium exists.
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Proposition 5 provides the explanation for this result. Since the Bayes-Nash equilibrium
is efficient, the highest bid in the Bayes-Nash equilibrium is induced if a bidder overbids all
bidders with an equal or lower type. In contrast, the highest rationalizable bid is induced
if a bidder overbids all other bidders.
5 Distributional and strategic uncertainty
In this section the formal model and the application to first-price auctions allow not only
for strategic but also for distributional uncertainty. The first subsection contains the
formal model, the second subsection collects all results for the general model. The third
subsection specifies the formal model for first-price auctions and the fourth subsection
provides the results.
5.1 Model
This subsection provides the formal model for a game under both, distributional and
strategic uncertainty. The underlying game of incomplete information is the same as in
section 2. As before, a player applying the maximin expected utility criterion plays a
simultaneous game against an adverse nature.
Action space of adverse nature Under distributional uncertainty the adverse nature’s
action space does not only consist of rationalizable strategies but also of the set of
distributions which the player considers to be possible. I allow for the possibility that a
player does not know the exact type distribution but has more knowledge than just the
other players’ type spaces. This is formalized in the following definition.
Definition 10. Let ∆Θ−i be the set of all probability distributions on Θ−i. The set ∆Θ−i
is the smallest subset of ∆Θ−i such that player i knows that the true type distribution is
an element in ∆Θ−i.
Analogously as for strategic uncertainty, it holds that distributional uncertainty is
present if the set ∆Θ−i is not a singleton. Note that the assumption that a player knows
that the true type distribution (or the true strategy) is an element of some set is w.l.o.g.
since it covers any possible knowledge structure. For example, if a bidder i knows only the
type spaces of the other bidders but nothing else about the type distribution, then ∆Θ−i
is equal to ∆Θ−i, the set of all type distributions on Θ−i. In contrast, if bidder i faces no
distributional uncertainty and knows that the distribution of the other bidders’ types is
given by a function F−i, then the set ∆Θ−i is equal to {F−i}.
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Throughout the paper I use the axiomatization of the knowledge operator where the
statement that a player knows something implies that it is true. Therefore, for every player
i it holds that the true type distribution of the other player is indeed an element in ∆Θ−i .
As in section 2, the strategies which a player considers to be possible are the set of
rationalizable strategies.
Rationalizable strategies As before, I assume common knowledge of rationality which
implies that the adverse nature has to choose from the set of rationalizable strategies. If
distributional uncertainty is added to strategic uncertainty, the definition of a rationalizable
action changes. Under distributional and strategic uncertainty a player is rational if her
action is a best reply given her type, a conjecture about the other players’ strategies and
a conjecture about the other players’ type distributions which is an element in ∆Θ−i .
Definition 11. ggggg
(i) Let i ∈ {1, . . . , I} be a player and θi ∈ Θi be a type of player i. The set of
rationalizable actions for player i is defined as follows. Set RS1i (θi) := Ai. Assume
that for k ∈ N the set RSki (θi) is already defined. Then the set RSk+1i (θi) is defined
as the set of all elements ai in Ai for which there exists a type distribution F−i ∈ ∆Θ−i
and a strategy profile β−i of the other players such that it holds
(i) aj ∈ supp (βj (θj)) for θj ∈ Θ⇒ aj ∈ RSkj (θj) for all j 6= i
(ii) ai ∈ argmax
a′i∈Ai
Ui (θi, a
′
i, β−i, F−i)
and RSi (θi) is given by
RSi (θi) =
⋂
k≥1
RSki (θi) .
(ii) A strategy βi of a player i is rationalizable if for every θi ∈ Θi every action ai with
ai ∈ supp (βi (θi)) > 0 is rationalizable, i.e. an element of RSi (θi).
(iii) For a player i let RS−i be the set of rationalizable strategies of the other I−1 players.
The definition of the possible distributions and strategies and of rationalizable strategies
allows for a formal definition of the adverse nature’s action space and therefore for a formal
definition of the simultaneous game against an adverse nature.
Simultaneous game against adverse nature The following definition summarizes
all components describing a game under distributional and strategic uncertainty.
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Definition 12. A game under distributional and strategic uncertainty consists of a game
of incomplete information, denoted by ({1, . . . , I},Θ, A, {ui}i ∈ {1, . . . , I}), a subset of
players {i1, . . . ik} ⊆ {1, . . . , I} applying the maximin expected utility criterion, and a
player n. For every i ∈ {i1, . . . , ik} player i chooses a strategy
βi : Θi → ∆Ai.
A strategy of n is a mapping which for every player i ∈ {i1, . . . ik} and for every possible
type of player i assigns a distribution of the other players’ valuations in a convex set ∆Θ−i
and a strategy of the other players in RS−i:
(βni1 , . . . , βnik ) : Θi1 × . . .×Θik →
(
RS−i1 ×∆Θ−i1
)× · · · × (RS−ik ×∆Θ−ik) .
(θi1 , . . . , θik)→
((
β
ni1 ,θi1
−i1 , F
ni1 ,θi1
−i1
)
, . . . ,
(
β
nik ,θik
−ik , F
nik ,θik
−ik
))
.
The utility of a player i ∈ {i1, . . . , ik} is given by
Ui
(
θi, βi (θi) , β
ni,θi
−i , F
ni,θi
−i
)
which is defined as in (1) and depends on the utility function of player i in the underlying
game of incomplete information, denoted by ui:
ui : A×Θi → R.
(a1, . . . , aI , θi) 7→ ui (a1, . . . , aI , θi)
The utility of player nature is given by
−
k∑
j=1
Ui
(
θi, βi (θi) , β
ni,θi
−i , F
ni,θi
−i
)
.
The term uncertainty can include distributional uncertainty or strategic uncertainty or
both. If only one type of uncertainty is present, I will refer to this case as pure distributional
or pure distributional uncertainty. For instance, a game under pure strategic uncertainty
as defined in section 2, is a special case of a game under distributional and strategic
uncertainty. If the type distribution F is common knowledge as defined in section 2, then
it holds for all players i that ∆Θ−i = {F−i}.
Now it is possible to define a maximin strategy in a game under distributional and
strategic uncertainty.
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Definition 13. In a game under distributional and strategic uncertainty for a player i a
strategy
βi : Θi → ∆Ai
is a maximin strategy if there exists a maximin equilibrium in the simultaneous game
between nature and player i such that βi is player i’s equilibrium strategy.
The Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous game between nature and player i is called
maximin equilibrium.
Analogously to section 2, one can define the subjective maximin belief of a bidder.
Definition 14. In a game under uncertainty let βni be the adverse nature’s maximin
equilibrium strategy projected on the i′th component. A subjective maximin belief of player
i with valuation θi is defined as
βni (θi) =
(
βni,θi−i , F
ni,θi
−i
)
,
that is, the adverse nature’s maximin equilibrium strategy evaluated at θi.
5.2 Outcomes under distributional and strategic uncertainty
The definition of an outcome in a game under distributional and strategic uncertainty is
analogous to the definition in a game under distributional and strategic uncertainty.
Definition 15. In a game under distributional and strategic uncertainty an outcome under
maximin strategies is a strategy profile (β1, . . . , βI , βn) such that for every i ∈ {1, . . . , I} it
holds that player i’s strategy is a maximin strategy given the adverse nature’s strategy βn.
Analogously to Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 the following Proposition and Corollary
hold true which state that a strategy played in an outcome under maximin strategies is
rationalizable and that every action which is a best reply to a profile of rationalizable
strategies is also rationalizable.
Proposition 8. In a game under distributional and strategic uncertainty let (β1, . . . , βI , βn)
be an outcome under maximin strategies. Then for every i ∈ {1, . . . , I, βn} it holds that βi
is a rationalizable strategy for player i.
The proof is relegated to Appendix A.
Corollary 2. In a game under distributional and strategic uncertainty let i ∈ {1, . . . , I}
be a player with valuation θi and for every j ∈ {1, . . . , I}\{i} let βj be a rationalizable
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strategy for player j. Let ai ∈ Ai be a best reply to β−i, i.e. it holds that
ai ∈ argmax
a′i∈Ai
Ui (θi, a
′
i, β−i, F−i) ,
then ai ∈ RSi (θi), that is, ai is a rationalizable action for player i with valuation θi.
I will now provide another simple condition which is sufficient for an action to be
rationalizable and therefore facilitates the derivation of maximin strategies. In order to do
so, the following definition is needed.
Definition 16. For a game under distributional and strategic uncertainty a profile of
strategies (β1, . . . , βI) ∈ ∆A1 × · · · ×∆AI together with a profile of subjective beliefs
about the other players’ type distributions
(
F 1−1, . . . , F
I
−I
) ∈ ∆Θ−1 × · · · ×∆Θ−I is called
subjective-belief equilibrium with given strategies if every player acts optimally given her
belief and the other players’ strategies, i.e. for every i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, every θi ∈ Θi and
every ai ∈ supp (βi(θi)) it holds that
ai ∈ argmax
a′i∈Ai
Ui
(
θi, a
′
i, β−i, F
i
−i
)
.
That is, in a subjective-belief equilibrium players best reply to each other’s strategies
but do not know each other’s type distributions. Every player forms a subjective belief
about the other players’ type distributions and acts optimally given this subjective belief
and the other players’ strategies. An example for a subjective-belief equilibrium is a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium with a common prior.
Example 3. Let the strategy profile (β1, . . . βI) together with the profile of beliefs(
Fˆ−1, . . . , Fˆ−I
)
be a Bayes-Nash equilibrium with a common prior. Then (β1, . . . βI)
together with
(
Fˆ−1, . . . , Fˆ−I
)
constitutes a subjective-belief equilibrium.
The following proposition states that a strategy which is played in a subjective-belief
equilibrium is rationalizable.
Proposition 9. In a game under distributional and strategic uncertainty an action ai ∈ Ai
is rationalizable for a player i with valuation θi if there exists a subjective-belief equilibrium
with strategies (β1, . . . , βI) such that ai ∈ supp (βi (θi)).
Proof. Let (β1, . . . , βI) together with
(
F 1−1, . . . , F
I
−I
)
be a subjective-belief equilibrium.
Let i be a player with valuation θi and ai be an action such that ai ∈ supp (βi (θi)). It is to
show that ai ∈ RSi(θi). I show by induction with respect to k that for every j ∈ {1, . . . , I},
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for every k ≥ 1 and for all θj ∈ Θj it holds that
aj ∈ supp (βj (θj))⇒ aj ∈ RSkj (θj) .
Then it follows that aj ∈ RSj (θj) and one can conclude that ai ∈ RSi (θi) because
ai ∈ supp (βi (θi)). It holds for all j ∈ {1, . . . , I} that
aj ∈ supp (βj (θj))⇒ aj ∈ RS1j (θj) for all θj ∈ Θj
since RS1j (θj) = Aj by definition. Assume it is already shown that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , I} it
holds that
ai ∈ supp (βj (θj))⇒ aj ∈ RSkθj for all θj ∈ Θj.
Let j be some player with type θj and subjective belief F
j
−j =
(
F j1 , . . . , F
j
j−1, F
j
j+1, . . . , F
j
I
)
.
Then F j−j and β−j fulfill the properties
(i) al ∈ supp (βl (θl))⇒ al ∈ RSlk (θl) for all l 6= j
(ii) aj ∈ supp (βj (θj))⇒ aj ∈ argmax
a′j∈Aj
Uj
(
θj, a
′
j, β−j, F
j
−j
)
.
The first property follows from the induction hypothesis and the second property follows
from the definition of a subjective-belief equilibrium with given strategies. By definition
of a rationalizable action, it follows that βj (θj) ∈ RSk+1j . Hence, it is shown that
aj ∈ supp (βj (θj))⇒ aj ∈ RSj (θj).
The analogous result as in Proposition 2 holds also for games under distributional
and strategic uncertainty. That is, every strategy played in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
is rationalizable and every action which is a best reply to a Bayes-Nash equilibrium is
rationalizable.
Proposition 10. Let the profile of strategies (β1, . . . , βI) together with the profile of type
distributions (F1, . . . , FI) constitute a Bayes-Nash equilibrium with a common prior of a
game of incomplete information. Then the following holds true:
(i) For every i ∈ {1, . . . , I} the strategy βi is rationalizable.
(ii) Let i ∈ {1, . . . I} be a player with valuation θi and let ai ∈ Ai be a best reply to β−i
and some distribution of the other players’ types F ′−i ∈ ∆Θ−i, i.e. it holds that
ai ∈ argmax
a′i∈Ai
Ui
(
θi, a
′
i, β−i, F
′
−i
)
,
then ai ∈ RSi (θi), that is, ai is a rationalizable action for player i with valuation θi.
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It can be proved as a direct result of Proposition 9.
Proof. As stated in Example 3, every Bayes-Nash equilibrium is a subjective-belief
equilibrium. Due to Proposition 9, every strategy played in a subjective-belief equilibrium
is rationalizable. Hence, every strategy played in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium is rationalizable
which proves the first part. Corollary 2 states that best replies to rationalizable strategies
are rationalizable. Therefore, a best reply to a strategy which is played in a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium is rationalizable which shows the second part.
If {i1, . . . , ik} is the set of players applying the maximin expected utility criterion, then
as under pure strategic uncertainty, the game against an adverse nature can be seen as k
independent two-player zero-sum games. This allows for the application of all results for
two-player zero-sum games including the existence result for Nash equilibria.
After presenting the formal model, I turn to the application to first-price auctions
under distributional and strategic uncertainty.
5.3 First-price auctions under distributional and strategic uncertainty:
Model
The underlying game of incomplete information is the same as for first-price auctions
under strategic uncertainty in subsection 4.1. What differs is the set of distributions a
bidder applying the maximin expected utility criterion considers to be possible. Before,
the valuation distribution was common knowledge. Now I assume that the set of possible
valuations, i.e. the support of the valuation distribution, and the mean of the valuation
distribution is common knowledge.
Possible distributions It is common knowledge that every bidder’s valuation is drawn
from the set Θ = {0 = θ1, θ2, . . . , θm−1, 1 = θm} according to a distribution with an
exogenously given mean µ. Formally, let
F I−1µ =
{
F1 × · · · × FI−1 ∈ ∆I−1 (Θ)
∣∣∣∣ m∑
i=1
θiPr
(
θi
)
= µ
}
,
the set of all distributions of independently drawn valuations for I − 1 bidders with mean
µ. Then it holds for every i ∈ {1, . . . , I} that
∆Θ−i = F I−1µ .
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As argued before, the above defined game of incomplete information uniquely defines
a game under distributional strategic uncertainty (after specifying the player applying
the maximin expected utility criterion). In the following I will call this game first-price
auction under distributional and strategic uncertainty.
5.4 First-price auctions under distributional and strategic uncertainty:
Results
Preview or results If in a first-price auction under distributional and strategic uncertainty
there exist types θk, θk
′
, θk
′′ ∈ Θ such that 0 < θk ≤ µ < θk′ < θk′′ , then every outcome is
inefficient.
For every type there exists a unique highest rationalizable bid. For every bidder and
every type the adverse nature chooses as the strategy of the other bidders that every
bidder places the highest rationalizable bid given her type.
Let θµ be the lowest valuation which is higher than the mean. The highest rationalizable
bid of a bidder with a valuation lower than θµ is her valuation. The subjective maximin
belief of a bidder with valuation lower than θµ about the other bidders’ valuation
distributions is that the probability weight is distributed between her own valuation
and θµ. As a consequence a bidder with a valuation lower than µ expects a utility of zero
and is indifferent between any bid between zero and her valuation.
A bidder applying the maximin expected utility criterion with a valuation θk such
that θk ≥ θµ never expects to win against a bidder with the same valuation. Hence, the
subjective maximin belief of the bidder about the other bidders’ valuation distribution
maximizes the probability weight on θk and makes the bidder indifferent between any
highest rationalizable bid of lower types. As a consequence, the bidder mixes among all
highest rationalizable bids of lower types. Therefore, if types θk, θk
′
, θk
′′ ∈ Θ such that
0 < θk ≤ µ < θk′ < θk′′ exist, then with positive probability type θk′′ bids zero and type
θk
′
bids the highest rationalizable bid of type θk which is θk. Conclusively, the outcome is
not efficient.
Example 4. Consider a first-price auction under distributional and strategic uncertainty
with two bidders 1 and 2 and three possible valuations 0, θ and 1 which are identically and
independently distributed with a commonly known mean µ. Assume that it holds θ < µ.
The first step is to calculate the highest rationalizable bid for every valuation.
The highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation zero is zero. Assume that
bidder 1 and bidder 2 have the subjective belief that the other bidder’s valuation distribution
distributes the probability weight between types θ and 1, i.e. there is zero probability weight
35
on type 0. Given that bidder 1 and bidder 2 have this subjective belief, the following
strategies constitute a Bayes-Nash equilibrium:
(i) Type θ of bidder 1 and bidder 2 bids θ.
(ii) Type 1 of bidder 1 and bidder 2 plays a mixed strategy on the interval [θ, b1] for
θ < b1 < 1.
Thus, it is part of a subjective-belief equilibrium that a bidder with valuation θ bids θ.
It follows from Proposition 9 that bidding θ is a rationalizable action for a bidder with
valuation θ. Since bidding above valuation cannot be rationalizable, the highest rationalizable
action of a bidder with valuation θ is to bid θ.
b
θ
= θ
µ0 b
1 1
Let b
1
denote the highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation 1. In order to
compute b
1
, consider the conjecture of a bidder with valuation 1 that the strategy of the
other bidder is such that
(iii) Type zero bids zero,
(iv) Type θ bids θ,
(vi) Type 1 bids
(
b
1
)−
.
It has been already shown that (iv) is rationalizable and similarly as in the case of pure
strategic uncertainty, one can show that (vi) is rationalizable. It follows from Corollary
2 that a best reply to the strategy described in (iii)− (vi) is rationalizable. Thus, this is
the rationalizable strategy which maximizes the expected utility of bidding b
1
and therefore
induces the highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation 1, i.e. bidding b
1
is a best
reply to this strategy.
A rationalizable bid is a best reply to a strategy of the other bidders and to a distribution
of their valuations. Hence, in addition to the strategy inducing b
1
, one has to derive the
valuation distribution inducing b
1
. Let (f 10 , f
1
θ , f
1
1 ) denote the corresponding probability
mass function. It must hold that
1− b1 ≥ f 10
1− b1 ≥ (f 10 + f 1θ ) (1− θ)
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which is equivalent to
1− b1 ≥ max{f 10 , (f 10 + f 1θ ) (1− θ)} .
Since b
1
is the highest bid for which this condition is fulfilled, it holds that
b
1
= 1−min max{f 10 , (f 10 + f 1θ ) (1− θ)}
which is equivalent to
b
1
= 1− f 10 = 1−
(
f 10 + f
1
θ
)
(1− θ) . (3)
Since probabilities have to add up to zero and the mean has to be preserved, the vector
(f 10 , f
1
θ , f
1
1 ) is the unique solution to the following system of linear equations
f 10 + f
1
θ + f
1
1 = 1
f 10 0 + f
1
θ θ + f
1
1 1 = µ
f 01 =
(
f 01 + f
θ
1
)
(1− θ) .
After obtaining the solution
f 10 =
1− µ
1 + θ
, f 1θ =
θ (1− µ)
1− θ2 , f
1
1 =
µ− θ2
1− θ2 ,
one can compute b
1
using equation (3), i.e. it holds
b
1
= 1− f 01 = 1−
(
f 01 + f
θ
1
)
(1− θ) = µ
1 + θ
.
After deriving the highest rationalizable bids for every type, the second step is to derive
the adverse nature’s strategy. In the setting of strategic and distributional uncertainty
the adverse nature’s strategy determines for every bidder and every type a strategy and a
valuation distribution of the other bidder. As in the case of pure strategic uncertainty, for
every bidder and every type the adverse nature chooses as the strategy of the other bidder
to place the highest rationalizable bid given her valuation.13
The subjective maximin belief of a bidder with valuation zero is irrelevant since such
a bidder always earns a utility of zero. For a bidder with valuation θ the adverse nature
13As in the case of pure strategic uncertainty, the strategy of the adverse nature is not necessarily
unique in a maximin equilibrium but in every equilibrium the strategies of the bidders coincide with the
best reply to the strategy of the adverse nature as described.
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chooses a distribution of the other bidder’s valuations which puts zero probability weight
on type zero. Since type θ bids θ, this induces an expected utility of zero for a bidder with
valuation θ. A bidder with valuation 1 never expects to win against a bidder with valuation
1. Therefore, a bidder with valuation 1 has to decide between bidding zero and bidding θ.
Hence, the adverse nature has to choose a valuation distribution
(
f˜ 01 , f˜
θ
1 , f˜
1
1
)
such that it
holds
min max
{
f˜ 01 ,
(
f˜ 01 + f˜
θ
1
)
(1− θ)
}
.
Since probabilities have to add up to one and the mean has to be preserved, the vector(
f˜ 01 , f˜
θ
1 , f˜
1
1
)
is the unique solution of the same system of linear equations as the vector(
f 01 , f
θ
1 , f
1
1
)
. Therefore, it holds that(
f˜ 01 , f˜
θ
1 , f˜
1
1
)
=
(
f 01 , f
θ
1 , f
1
1
)
.
In the final step, for every bidder and every type one has to find the set of best replies
to the adverse nature’s strategy. Moreover, one has to identify the best replies such that
the adverse nature does not have an incentive to deviate from her strategy derived in the
second step. Since the expected utility of a bidder does not decrease if one of the other
bidders places a lower bid, the adverse nature does not have an incentive to deviate from
the strategy where for every bidder and every type she prescribes the highest rationalizable
bid.14 Hence, it is sufficient to check whether the adverse nature has an incentive to deviate
from the chosen distributions.
A bidder with valuation zero bids zero. A bidder with valuation θ expects a utility of
zero and is indifferent between any bid in the interval [0, θ]. Hence, the adverse nature does
not have an incentive to deviate. A bidder with valuation 1 is indifferent between bidding
0 and θ. In a maximin equilibrium in the game against the adverse nature, a bidder with
valuation 1 mixes between 0 and θ in a way such that the adverse nature is indifferent
among any valuation distribution which fulfills the constraints that probabilities add up to
one and the mean µ is preserved. Therefore, the adverse nature does not have an incentive
to deviate.
Note that the distribution of the other bidder’s valuations which the adverse nature
chooses for a type is the same distribution which induces the highest rationalizable bid
for this type. That is, a bidder i with a given type assumes that her opponent j has the
same assumption about i’s valuation distribution as i’s assumption about j’s valuation
14An exception is that if one bidder bids above her valuation, it would be a best reply of the adverse
nature to choose as the strategy of the other bidders that every other bidder bids zero. This would induce
a strictly negative utility for the bidder bidding above her valuation. However, one can exclude this
exception in a maximin equilibrium.
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distribution. But bidder i assumes that j has a different belief about i’s strategy than i’s
belief about j’s strategy.
The insights from the example about bidders’ strategies are generalized in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 11. Consider a first-price auction under distributional and strategic uncertainty.
There exists an outcome under maximin strategies. If there exist types θk, θk
′
, θk
′′ ∈ Θ such
that 0 < θk ≤ µ < θk′ < θk′′, then there does not exist an efficient outcome.
The proof is relegated to Appendix F.
The inefficiency stems from the fact that every type above µ mixes between all highest
rationalizable bids of all lower types. With positive probability type θk
′′
bids zero and type
θk
′
bids the highest rationalizable bid of type θk which is θk. Conclusively, the outcome is
not efficient.
Similarly as under pure strategic uncertainty, I will show the existence of an outcome
under maximin strategies by construction. The following three steps serve as a preparation
for the calculation of the highest rationalizable bids.
(I) Show that for every type θk ∈ Θ there exists a unique highest rationalizable bid bθk .
(II) Show that for every type zero is a rationalizable bid.
(III) Show that for every type θk ∈ Θ every bid in the interval [0, bθk ] is rationalizable.
The explanation for steps (I)-(III) works analogously as for steps (I)-(III) in the case of
pure strategic uncertainty. For the calculation of the highest rationalizable bids, first,
consider valuations equal or below µ. Analogously as in the example, on can show that the
highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation θk such that θk ≤ µ is θk. This bid is
induced by the subjective belief equilibrium where the probability weight is distributed
between types θk and θµ and all bidders with valuation θ
k bid θk, where θµ is the smallest
valuation strictly higher than µ.
The calculation of the highest rationalizable bids for higher types works by recursion.
Assume that for a bidder i with valuation θk ≥ θµ and that for all j < k the highest
rationalizable bids has been already computed. The highest rationalizable bid b
θk
of a
bidder with valuation θk is a best reply to a conjecture about the other bidders’ strategies
and distributions.
The strategies which induce b
θk
are given by
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(i) Every bidder with valuation θj such that θj < θk bids her highest rationalizable bid.
(ii) Every bidder with valuation θk bids
(
b
θk
)−
.
The valuation distribution of the other bidders which induces b
θk
has to minimize the
incentive to bid another bid. In addition, probabilities have to add up to zero and the
mean µ has to be preserved. Let
(
f θ
k
θ1 , . . . , f
θk
θm
)
be a vector of probabilities such that
according to the valuation distribution inducing b
θk
, type θl of some bidder j 6= i occurs
with probability f θ
k
θl
.
Hence, the vector
(
f θ
k
θ1 , . . . , f
θk
θm
)
is the solution to the following minimization problem
min max
{(
f θ
k
θ1
)I−1
θk,
(
f θ
k
θ1 + f
θk
θ2
)I−1 (
θk − bθ2
)
, ...,
(
f θ
k
θ1 + · · ·+ f θ
k
θk−1
)I−1 (
θk − bθk−1
)}
s.t. f θ
k
θ1 + · · ·+ f θ
k
θm = 1
f θ
k
θ1 θ
1 + · · ·+ f θkθmθm = µ.
As proved in the Appendix, in the solution of this minimization problem all terms of
the form (
j∑
i=1
f θ
k
θi
)I−1 (
θk − bθj
)
for 1 ≤ j < k
have to be equal.
The recursive calculation of the highest rationalizable bids and the distributions
inducing them, is formalized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 12. Consider a first-price auction under distributional and strategic uncertainty.
For θk ≤ µ the highest rationalizable bid bθ is equal to θk.
Assume that for all j < k, the highest rationalizable bid b
θj
has been already defined
and it holds θk > µ. Then for the vector f θ
k
=
(
f θ
k
θ1 , . . . , f
θk
θm
)
it holds that f θ
k
θj = 0 for
j > k and the vector
(
f θ
k
θ1 , . . . , f
θk
θk
)
is the unique solution of the following system of k
linear equations given by
k∑
i=1
f θ
k
θi = 1
k∑
i=1
f θ
k
θi θ
i = µ
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(
f θ
k
θ1
)I−1
θk =
(
j∑
i=1
f θ
k
θi
)I−1 (
θk − bθj
)
for 1 < j < k.
The highest rationalizable bid b
θk
is obtained by the equation
b
θk
= θk −
(
f θ
k
θ1
)I−1
θk.
The proof is relegated to Appendix F. After calculating the highest rationalizable
bid for every type, one can specify the strategies played in an outcome under maximin
strategies.
Proposition 13. In a first-price auction under distributional and strategic uncertainty
it holds for every outcome under maximin strategies and for every bidder i and every
valuation θk that
(i) Every bidder with valuation θk such that θk ≤ µ is indifferent between any bid in the
interval [0, θk].
(ii) Every bidder with valuation θk such that θk > µ mixes among the bids {bθj | j < k},
that is, among the set of all highest rationalizable bids of lower types.
The proof is relegated to Appendix F.
6 Conclusion
I conclude by first providing a short summary and afterwards discussing the assumptions
made in this paper as well as possible extensions.
6.1 Summary
I propose a new decision criterion for players who face strategic uncertainty in games
of incomplete information. The decision criterion works in two steps. First, I assume
common knowledge of rationality and eliminate all strategies which do not survive the
iterated elimination of strategies which are not best replies. Second, I apply the maximin
expected utility criterion. With this decision criterion one can derive recommendations
for a player facing strategic uncertainty and analyze outcomes under the assumption that
every player follows this decision criterion. Moreover, I provide an extension of the model
to distributional and strategic uncertainty.
I apply this decision criterion to first-price auctions under pure strategic uncertainty
and under both, distributional and strategic uncertainty. In both cases every bidder has
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the subjective belief that every other bidder places the highest rationalizable bid given her
type. Therefore, a bidder applying the proposed decision criterion resorts to win against
lower types with certainty by bidding highest rationalizable bids of lower types. Besides
providing recommendations for bidders facing strategic oder distributional uncertainty in
first-price auctions, I characterize all outcomes under the assumption that every bidder
applies this criterion. Under pure strategic uncertainty every outcome is efficient. Under
distributional and strategic uncertainty every outcome is inefficient (under a mild condition
on the number and distribution of possible valuations).
6.2 Discussion
Choice of decision criterion
The decision criterion under uncertainty used in this paper is the maximin expected utility
criterion. The analogous analysis could be conducted with other criteria such as the
minimax expected regret criterion.
Possible distributions and strategies
In this paper I restricted the set of possible strategies by assuming common knowledge of
rationality and the set of possible distributions by assuming common knowledge of a mean.
This restriction is crucial for the application of the maximin expected utility criterion.
Otherwise, in first-price auctions there would exist a distribution or strategy inducing an
expected utility of zero for a player independent of her action.
For example, Bergemann and Schlag (2008) apply the maximin expected utility criterion
to a monopoly pricing problem where a seller faces uncertainty about the buyer’s valuation
distribution. Without a restriction of the set of possible distributions the adverse nature
would choose a distribution which puts the whole probability weight on valuation zero.
Thus, they assume that the seller knows that the buyer’s true valuation distribution is in
the neighborhood of a model distribution. Other papers applying the maximin expected
utility criterion to distributional uncertainty also assume an exogenously given restriction
of the set of possible distributions.
Due to a similar reasoning, a restriction of the set of possible strategies is required if
the maximin expected utility criterion is applied to strategic uncertainty. For example, if
one would apply the maximin expected utility criterion to a first-price auction where a
bidder faces uncertainty about the other bidders’ strategies, then without a restriction
of the set of possible strategies the adverse nature would choose a strategy of the other
bidders such that all bidders place arbitrarily high bids. First, such strategies do not
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seem plausible. Second, the maximin expected utility criterion does not provide a useful
recommendation. In order to solve these issues, one could also exogenously restrict the
set of possible strategies. For example, Kasberger and Schlag (2017) apply the minimax
regret criterion to first-price auctions and assume common knowledge of an exogenously
given restriction of the players’ bidding strategies, for instance, in form of a lower bound
of the highest bid.
However, the fact that rational agents interact strategically in a given economic setting
already contains information about the possible strategies. Thus, it is possible to use
an endogenous restriction of the set of possible strategies - which is given by the set of
rationalizable strategies - in order to apply the maximin expected utility criterion. The
model can be easily extended in a way which allows for additional (exogenously given)
knowledge about possible strategies.
Under distributional uncertainty an exogenously given restriction of the set of possible
distributions is still necessary. Besides fixing the mean, there exist other possibilities to
restrict the set of possible distributions and strategies. For instance, one could investigate
outcomes under distributional uncertainty under the assumption that further moment
conditions of the type distribution are common knowledge.
Cognitive complexity
Formally, the derivation of the set of rationalizable actions for an agent with a given type
requires an infinite intersection of sets. However, the proofs use a finite number of recursion
steps. In the model under strategic uncertainty and in the model under distributional
uncertainty the bid of a bidder with type θk is obtained after at most k recursion steps.
One could argue that a sufficiently rational player can conduct the necessary calculations.
But one could also argue that for some players these calculations may be too difficult.
Therefore, similarly as in level-k models, one could define the concept of k-rationalizability.
That is, a player i could know that her opponent can compute the set RSkj for all players
j and for k ∈ N, but cannot compute the sets RSk′j for k′ > k (see Bernheim (1984)).
Depending on the parameters, this knowledge can influence player i’s maximin strategy.
Robustness
In addition to the maximin expected utility criterion, one could introduce an additional
robustness criterion in the following sense: Does the maximin strategy of an agent change if
the adverse nature deviates from her strategy to another strategy in an -neighborhood? If
there is a change, does the strategy and the resulting expected utility change continuously?
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As an example, consider a first-price auction under pure strategic uncertainty with
a commonly known distribution function, two bidders and three valuations 0, θ and 1.
Bidder 1 with valuation 1 has the subjective maximin belief that bidder 2 with valuation
1 bids b
1
. Hence, bidder 1 with valuation 1 bids either bθ or zero. However, all bids in the
interval [0, b
1
] are rationalizable for a bidder with valuation 1. Hence, (if the bid grid is
sufficiently fince) an -neighborhood of b
1
and its intersection with the set of rationalizable
actions contains bids lower than b
1
. If bidder 1 with valuation 1 has the subjective belief
that bidder 2 with valuation 1 bids lower than b
1
, e.g.
(
b
1
)−
, then b
1
becomes a best reply
for bidder 1 with valuation 1. This constitutes a discontinuity in her best reply.
As a second example, consider a first-price auction under pure strategic uncertainty
with two bidders and a commonly known common valuation v. To bid v is the highest
rationalizable action for both bidders. Therefore, bidder 1 has the subjective maximin
belief that bidder 2 bids v. As a consequence, bidder 1 is indifferent between any bid
in [0, v]. Assume that bidder 1 chooses the action v (or v−). As any other bid, this
leads to a utility of zero given the subjective maximin belief that bidder 2 bids v. An
-neighborhood of v and its intersection with the set of rationalizable actions contains only
bids below v, e.g. it contains the bids v,v− and (v−)−. The best replies to these bids are
in an -neighborhood of v (or v−) and the induced utilities are in an -neighborhood of
zero. Hence, bidding v (or v−) fulfills the robustness property that an -deviation of the
subjective maximin belief induces an -deviation of the best replies and expected utility.
44
Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 1 and 8
Proof. Proposition 1 is a special case of Proposition 8 such that for every player i it holds
that ∆Θ−i = F−i where F is the commonly known valuation distribution as assumed in
Proposition 1. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove Proposition 8. Every player maximizes
her expected utility given a distribution of the other players’ types and a rationalizable
strategy of the other players chosen by nature. Let (β1, . . . , βI , βn) be an outcome under
maximin strategies. It is to show that for every player i and for every type θi an action ai
which is in the support of βi (θi) is an element in RS
k
i (θi) for every k ≥ 1. The proof works
by induction. It is true that for every i ∈ {1, . . . , I} every action ai ∈ Ai is an element
in RS1i (θi) since it holds by definition that RS
1
i (θi) = Ai. Assume it is already shown
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , I} and every θi ∈ Θi that every action ai with ai ∈ supp (βi (θi)) is
an element in RSki (θi). Let i bid a bidder with valuation θi. Since n can choose only
among rationalizable strategies, it holds for every j 6= i that βni,θij is a rationalizable
strategy. By definition, this implies that for every θj ∈ Θj and every action aj with
aj ∈ supp
(
βni,θij (θj)
)
it holds that aj ∈
⋂
k≥1RS
k
j (θj). It follows that
(i) aj ∈ supp
(
βni,θij (θj)
)
for θj ∈ Θj ⇒ aj ∈ RSjk (θj) for all j 6= i.
By definition of an outcome under maximin strategies, it holds for every action ai with
ai ∈ supp (βi (θi)) that ai is a best reply given the adverse nature’s strategy, i.e. a best
reply to the other bidders’ valuation distribution and strategies chosen by the adverse
nature. Therefore, it holds that
(ii) ai ∈ supp (βi (θi))⇒ ai ∈ argmax
a′i∈Ai
Ui
(
θi, a
′
i, β
ni,θi
−i , F
ni,θi
−i
)
.
By definition of the set RSk+1i (θi), it follows from (i) and (ii) that for every ai with
ai ∈ supp (βi (θi)) is an element in RSk+1i (θi) and it follows by induction that ai is an
element in RSki (θi) for every k ≥ 1.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Since Proposition 2 is a special case of Proposition 10 such that for every player i it holds
that ∆Θ−i = F−i, where F is the commonly known valuation distribution as assumed in
Proposition 2, the proof follows from the proof of Proposition 10.
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C Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. (i) At first, I consider the case where there exists a unique bidder k who has
the highest valuation and show that her highest rationalizable bid is the second-highest
valuation, denoted by θ′k. In order to do so, I will show by induction that for every bidder
i 6= k the bids in the interval (θk′ , 1] are not rationalizable. Let i be an arbitrary bidder
which is not bidder k. Hence, bidder i’s valuation is strictly lower than 1. The induction
steps are descending and start with 1. Since 1 is the highest possible bid, bidder i wins
with strictly positive probability if she bids 1 which cannot be rationalizable since she
would earn a negative utility with positive probability. For the induction step assume that
it has been shown that all bids equal or higher than b with b ∈ (θk′ , 1] are not rationalizable
for all bidders i 6= k. It is to show that for an arbitrary bidder i 6= k the bid b− is not
rationalizable if b− > θk′ . Since all bids strictly higher than b− are not rationalizable
for all bidders besides bidder k, it is also never a best reply for bidder k to bid strictly
higher than b−. Therefore, bidder i wins with strictly positive probability if she bids b−.
Since b− is strictly higher than her valuation, this cannot be optimal. This completes
the induction step from which follows that for all bidders i 6= k the bids in the interval
(θk′ , 1] are not rationalizable. It follows that for bidder k all bids in the interval (θk′ , 1] are
not rationalizable. In every Nash equilibrium the highest bidder bids the second-highest
valuation θk′ . Since according to part (i) of Proposition 2 a strategy played in a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium is rationalizable, the bid θk′ is rationalizable for bidder k. It follows that θk′ is
the highest rationalizable bid of bidder k.
If the adverse nature chooses for all bidders i 6= k as the action of bidder k to bid
θ′k , i.e. β
ni,θi
k (θk) = θk′ , every bidder i 6= k with valuation θi expects a utility of zero
independent of her action. Therefore, any other strategy of the adverse nature which is
played in a maximin equilibrium, has to induce an expected utility of zero for every bidder
i 6= k. That is, the subjective maximin belief of a bidder i 6= k with valuation θi is that
at least one other bidder bids equal or higher than θi. As a result, every bidder i 6= k is
indifferent between all bids in the interval [0, θi]. It is left to show that a bidder i 6= k
does not bid above her valuation. Assume there exists a bidder i with valuation θi who
bids b > θi. Since for all bidders j 6= k bidding zero is rationalizable, it is rationalizable
for bidder k to bid zero. Given that bidder i bids b, the adverse nature chooses as the
strategy of the other bidders to bid zero, i.e. for every j 6= i it holds that βni,θij (θj) = 0.
As a result, bidder i wins with probability 1 and expects a negative utility which cannot
be part of a maximin equilibrium. Hence, none of the bidders places bids strictly higher
than her valuation in a maximin equilibrium.
In order to minimize the expected utility of bidder k, the adverse nature chooses as
46
the strategy of the second-highest bidder, i.e. bidder k′ with valuation θk′ , to bid her
valuation i.e. βnk,θkk′ (θk′) = θk′ . This is the highest rationalizable bid which can be placed
by a bidder who is not bidder k. As a consequence, bidder k bids θk′ .
(ii) Finally, I consider the case where at least two bidders have the highest valuation
θk. Analogously as before, one can show by induction that for every bidder the bids in the
interval (θk, 1] are not rationalizable. In every Nash equilibrium every highest bidder bids
her valuation θk. Therefore, it holds due to Corollary 2 that the bid θk is rationalizable
for every highest bidder. It follows that θk is the highest rationalizable bid and therefore
is the action which the adverse nature chooses as the action of a highest bidder k for a
bidder i 6= k, i.e. βni,θik (θk) = θk. This implies that every bidder does not expect to earn a
positive utility and therefore is indifferent between any bid between zero and her valuation.
Bids strictly higher than the own valuation can be excluded analogously as above.
D Proof of Propositions 4, 5 and 6
In order to prove Propositions 4 and 5, I will show the following Lemmas which formalize
steps (I) -(III).
Lemma 1. For every bidder i and every valuation θk ∈ Θ there exists a unique highest
rationalizable bid b
θk
. This bid does not depend on the identity of bidder i.
Proof. For every bidder i and every valuation θi the set of rationalizable actions RSi (θi)
is a finite set in a metric space and therefore compact. Since every compact set contains
its supremum, there exists a maximum element of the set RSi (θi). Since this is a subset
of B and by definition, B is well-ordered with respect to the relation ≤, the maximum
element of RSi (θi) has to be unique. Due to the symmetry of the bidders, the highest
rationalizable bid does not depend on the identity of the bidder.
Lemma 2. For every type θk ∈ Θ zero is a rationalizable bid.
Proof. The proof works by induction with respect to the types in Θ. The induction starts
with θ1 = 0. Montiero (2009) shows that with a given commonly known distribution there
exists a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the first-price auction with discrete valuations where
type zero bids zero. It follows from part (i) of Corollary 2 that zero is a rationalizable
action for type zero.
For the induction step assume that it has been already shown for all types θj with
j ≤ k that zero is a rationalizable action for type θj. Consider a bidder i with valuation
θk+1 who conjectures that all other bidders with type θj such that j ≤ k bid zero which is
rationalizable by assumption. According to Lemma 1, for every bidder and every type
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there exists a highest rationalizable bid. Let the conjecture of bidder i with valuation θk+1
be such that every other bidder with type θj such that j > k bids her highest rationalizable
bid. Since all types with valuation θj such that j > k bid at least the highest rationalizable
bid of type θk+1 and all other types bid zero, it is a best reply of bidder i with valuation
θk+1 to bid zero. As stated in Corollary 1, a best reply to a rationalizable strategy profile
is rationalizable and therefore zero is a rationalizable action for bidder i with type θk+1.
This completes the induction step and hence one can conclude that for every bidder and
every type zero is a rationalizable action.
Lemma 3. For every type θk ∈ Θ every bid in [0, bθk ] is rationalizable.
Proof. The proof works by showing a formally stronger statement by induction with
respect to the types in Θ. The statement is that for every type θk ∈ Θ it holds that every
bid in the interval [0, b
θk
] is rationalizable for every type θj such that j ≥ k.
The induction starts with k = 1, i.e. with θ1 = 0. The highest rationalizable bid for
type θ1 is zero and it follows from Lemma 2 that zero is a rationalizable bid for every type
θj ≥ θ1.
For the induction step assume that it has been already shown that for all l ≤ k it holds
that every bid in the interval [0, b
θl
] is rationalizable for every type θj such that j ≥ l. By
using induction with respect to the bids, I will show that the same statement holds for
type θk+1. The induction starts with the bid zero. It follows from Lemma 2 that zero
is rationalizable for every type. For the induction step assume that it has been already
shown that every bid in the interval [0, b] with b < b
θk+1
is rationalizable for every type θj
with j ≥ k + 1. In order to show that b+ is rationalizable for every type θj with j ≥ k + 1,
consider a bidder i with valuation θj with j ≥ k + 1 and strategies of the other bidders
such that for every other bidder it holds that
(i) Every type θh with h < j bids her highest rationalizable bid.
(ii) Every type θh with h ≥ j bids b.
The strategies in (i) are rationalizable by definition and the strategies in (ii) are rationalizable
by the assumption in the induction step (in the second induction with respect to the bids
in the interval [0, b
θk
]). Given this conjecture about the other bidders’ strategies it is a
best reply for bidder i with valuation θj to bid b+. Any change in part (i) would imply
that there exists a bidder with valuation θl such that l < k+ 1 who bids some bid bθ
l
< b
θl
instead of b
θl
which does not increase the expected utility of bidding b+. Any deviation
from (ii) implies that there exists at least one bidder and a valuation θh with h ≥ j such
that this bidder places either a lower or a higher bid than b. If the bid is lower, then the
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same reasoning as above applies. If a bidder with valuation θh deviates to a higher bid,
then by bidding b+ bidder i with valuation θj does not overbid type θl of the deviating
bidder anymore which decreases bidder i’s winning probability.
Conclusively, any conjecture deviating from the strategies in (i) and (ii) does not
increase the expected utility of bidding b+. Therefore, if bidding b+ is not a best reply to
the beliefs in (i) and (ii), then b is the highest rationalizable bid for type θj which is a
contradiction to the assumption b < b
θk
. This completes the induction step of the second
induction. It follows that any bid in the interval [0, b
θk+1
] is rationalizable for every type
θj with j ≥ k + 1. This completes the induction step of the first induction. Therefore, it
has been shown that for every type θk ∈ Θ it holds that every bid in the interval [0, bθk ] is
rationalizable for every type θj such that j ≥ k.
After proving Lemmas 1-3, I continue with the proof of Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Consider a bidder with valuation θk. As shown in the proof of Lemma 3, for every
type the conjecture given by
(i) Every type θl with l < k bids her highest rationalizable bid .
(ii) Every type θj with j ≥ k bids
(
b
θk
)−
.
induces the highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation θk , that is, the highest
rationalizable bid b
θk
of a bidder with valuation θk is a best reply to the conjecture that
all other bidders employ this strategy. Given this conjecture, the expected utility of a
bidder with type θk ∈ Θ who bids bθk is given by
θk − bθk .
This utility has to be higher than the utility induced by any other bid. A bid can be
a best reply for a bidder if she just overbids some other bidder. Formally, a bid b can
be best reply for a bidder with valuation θk only if there exists a bidder j 6= i and a
valuation θl < θk such that bidder j with valuation θl bids b (or there exists a bidder j
with valuation θl ≥ θk such that bidder j with valuation θl bids b− or b). Hence, the only
potential candidates for best replies besides b
θk
are bids b
θj
with j < k. Thus, equation
(2) ensures that bidding b
θk
induces at least the same expected utility than any other bid
which can be a best reply.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. I show the existence of an efficient outcome under maximin strategies by construction
and then show that bidders’ strategies are equal in every outcome. Conclusively, there exists
an outcome under maximin strategies and every outcome is efficient. The construction
of an efficient outcome works as follows. According to Lemma 1 for every type there
exists a unique highest rationalizable bid. For every type and every player the adverse
nature chooses the other bidders’ strategies such that every bidder places the highest
rationalizable bid given her type, i.e. for pair of bidders i, j and for every pair of valuations
θi, θj it holds that
βni,θij (θj) = b
θj
. (4)
Let βn denote this adverse nature’s strategy. Independent of the bidders’ strategies there
does not exist another strategy of the adverse nature which induces a lower expected
utility for any of the bidders.15 Thus, the adverse nature does not have an incentive to
deviate from this strategy. Every bidder plays a best reply given her type and the adverse
nature’s strategy. Due to the compactness of B, such a best reply always exists. I will
show that the outcome defined by these best replies is efficient.
For a bidder with valuation θk the best reply is given by the most profitable overbidding
of a lower type, that is, by
argmax
b
θj<θk
F
(
θj
) (
θk − bθj
)
.
Let b
θl
be a best reply of a bidder with valuation θk. Then it holds for all j ∈
{1, . . . , k − 1} that
F
(
θl
) (
θk − bθl
)
≥ F (θj) (θk − bθj) (5)
⇔ θk (F (θl)− F (θj))− F (θl) bθl + F (θj) bθj ≥ 0. (6)
Since F
(
θl
) − F (θj) ≥ 0 for 1 ≤ j < l, it follows from (6) that for all θk′ such that
θk
′
> θk and for all 1 ≤ j < l it holds that
θk
′ (
F
(
θl
)− F (θj))− F (θl) bθl + F (θj) bθj ≥ 0
⇔ F (θl) (θk′ − bθl) ≥ F (θj) (θk′ − bθj) . (7)
15An exception is that if one bidder bids above her valuation, it would be a best reply of the adverse
nature to choose as the strategy of the other bidders that every other bidder bids zero. This would induce
a strictly negative utility for the bidder bidding above her valuation. However, one can exclude this
exception in a maximin equilibrium.
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First, consider the case where for every j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} the inequality in (5) is strict.
Then for a bidder with valuation θk there exists a unique best reply, denoted by b
θl
. Hence,
in order to show efficiency, it is sufficient to show that every best reply of a bidder with
valuation θk
′
with θk
′
> θk is equal or greater than b
θl
.
It holds for every 1 ≤ j < l that the inequality in (7) is strict. It follows that none of
the bids b
θj
for 1 ≤ j < l can be a best reply for a bidder with valuation θk′ . Thus, a best
reply of a bidder with valuation θk
′
with θk
′
> θk is equal or greater than b
θl
.
Second, consider the case where for at least one j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} the expression in
(5) holds with equality. Let j1, . . . jh be all indices for which it holds that the expression
in (5) holds with equality where θjh = max
j∈{j1,...,jh}
θj. That is, bθh is the highest best
reply of a bidder with valuation θk. Then for all j ∈ {j1, . . . , jh}\{jh} it must hold that
F (θjh) > F (θj). Thus, for all j < jh it holds that
θk
′ (
F
(
θjh
)− F (θj))− F (θjh) bθjh + F (θj) bθj > 0
⇔ F (θjh) (θk′ − bθjh) > F (θj) (θk′ − bθj) .
For all j such that j < jh and j /∈ {j1, . . . , jh} as in the first case, it holds that the inquality
in (5) is strict and therefore also the inequality in (7). Conclusively, the best reply of a
bidder with valuation θk
′
is at least as high as the highest best reply of a bidder with
valuation θk. Therefore, the outcome is efficient.
So far, I have shown by construction that an outcome under maximin strategies exists
and that this outcome is efficient. More precisely, I have shown that any combination of
best replies to the adverse nature’s strategy βn as defined in (4) is efficient. Formally, let
Bθ
j
be the set of best replies for a bidder with valuation θj given the adverse nature’s
strategy βn, i.e. B
θj is defined by
Bθ
j
= argmax
b′∈B
U
(
θj, b′, βn, F
)
.
Let (b1, . . . , bm) be a vector of bids such that bj ∈ Bθj for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Then for
every i, j with j > i, it holds that bj ≥ bi.
It remains to show that every outcome is efficient. In order to show that every outcome
is efficient, I will show that if
(
βˆ1, . . . βˆI , βˆn
)
is an outcome under maximin strategies,
then it holds for every bidder j and every valuation θj that
Bˆθj ⊆ Bθj
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where Bˆθ
j
is defined by
Bˆθ
j
= argmax
b′∈B
U
(
θj, b′, βˆn, F
)
.
Assume there exists an outcome under maximin strategies, denoted by
(
βˆ1, . . . βˆI , βˆn
)
,
such that there exists a bidder i with valuation θi and a bid b such that b ∈ supp
(
βˆi (θi)
)
and b /∈ Bθi . This implies that there exists a bidder j 6= i and a valuation θl such that
βˆni,θij (θ
l) 6= βni,θi(θl) and
b ∈ supp
(
βni,θij
(
θl
))
or b− ∈ supp
(
βni,θij
(
θl
))
(depending on whether θi > θ
l or θi ≤ θl). In other words, since the outcome is not efficient,
there exists a bidder i who bids differently than in the efficient outcome by bidding b. This
in turn implies that there exists another bidder j such that in the subjective maximin
belief of bidder i with valuation θi bidder j’s strategy differs from the strategy prescribed
by βn in a way which makes the bid b a best reply for bidder i.
Since in the subjective maximin belief of bidder i bidder j with valuation θl deviates
from bidding her highest rationalizable bid and cannot bid higher than the highest
rationalizable bid of type θl, it holds that b < b
θl
. Therefore, the adverse nature could
strictly decrease the winning probability of bidder i with valuation θi by deviating to the
strategy which prescribes to bid bθl for bidder j with valuation θ
l. Thus,
(
βˆ1, . . . βˆI , βˆn
)
cannot constitute an outcome under maximin strategies. Conclusively, every outcome
under maximin strategies has to be efficient.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. With the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 4, one can show that for
every outcome
(
βˆ1, . . . βˆI , βˆn
)
under maximin strategies it holds for every bidder i and
every valuation θi that
Bθi ⊆ Bˆθi
where Bˆθi and Bθi are defined by
Bθ
j
= argmax
b′∈B
U
(
θj, b′, βn, F
)
, Bˆθ
j
= argmax
b′∈B
U
(
θj, b′, βˆn, F
)
and βn is defined as in (4). This is the strategy of the adverse nature which chooses as the
subjective maximin belief for every bidder and every valuation that every other bidder
places the highest rationalizable bid given her valuation. It follows that
Bˆθi = Bθi
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That is, in every outcome under maximin strategies, bidders play best replies to the
adverse nature’s strategy βn. Therefore, in every outcome the bidders’ strategies are as
specified in Proposition 6.
E Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. The proof works by induction with respect to the type. Since b
θ1
= b
θ1
∗ , the
induction starts with θ2. The highest rationalizable bid for type θ2 is obtained by the
equation
θ2 − bθ2 = F I−1 (0) θ2
⇔ bθ2 = θ2 (1− F I−1 (0)) .
The highest bid which is placed by a bidder with valuation θ2 in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
is obtained by the equation
F I−1
(
θ2
) (
θ2 − bθ2∗
)
= F I−1 (0) θ2
⇔ bθ2∗ =
θ2
(
F I−1 (θ2)− F I−1 (0))
F I−1 (θ2)
.
Since m ≥ 3, it holds that F I−1 (θ2) < 1 from which follows that
F I−1
(
θ2
)
F I−1 (0) < F I−1 (0)
⇔ F I−1 (θ2)− F I−1 (θ2)F I−1 (0) > F I−1 (θ2)− F I−1 (0)
⇔ 1− F I−1 (0) > F
I−1 (θ2)− F I−1 (0)
F I−1 (θ2)
⇔ bθ2 > bθ2∗ .
For the induction step assume that it has been already shown that b
θj
> b
θj
∗ for all j ≤ k.
It has to be shown that
b
θk+1
> b
θk+1
∗ .
As stated in Proposition 5, it holds that
θk+1 − bθk+1 = max
θj<θk+1
F I−1
(
θj
) (
θk+1 − bθj
)
.
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Let
F I−1
(
θl
) (
θk+1 − bθl
)
= max
θj<θk+1
F I−1
(
θj
) (
θk+1 − bθj
)
.
Since b
θk+1
∗ is a best reply, it must induce an expected utility which is greater or equal
than the expected utility induced by any other bid, given that every other bidder plays
equilibrium strategies. Hence, it holds that
F I−1
(
θk+1
) (
θk+1 − bθk+1∗
)
≥ F I−1 (θl) (θk+1 − bθl∗ ) .
Due to the induction assumption, it holds that b
θl
∗ < b
θl
from which follows that
θk+1 − bθk+1 = F I−1 (θl) (θk+1 − bθl) < F I−1 (θl) (θk+1 − bθl∗ )
≤ F I−1 (θk+1) (θk+1 − bθk+1∗ )
and therefore it holds that
θk+1 − bθk+1 < F I−1 (θk+1) (θk+1 − bθk+1∗ ) .
⇔ bθk+1∗ <
b
θk+1 − θk+1 (1− F I−1 (θk+1))
F I−1 (θk+1)
. (8)
It holds that
θk+1 − bθk+1 ≥ 0
⇔ θk+1 (1− F I−1 (θk+1))− bθk+1 (1− F I−1 (θk+1)) ≥ 0
⇔ bθk+1 − θk+1 (1− F I−1 (θk+1)) ≤ F I−1 (θk+1) bθk+1
⇔ b
θk+1 − θk+1 (1− F I−1 (θk+1))
F I−1 (θk+1)
≤ bθk+1 .
Due to equation (8), it follows that
b
θk+1
> b
θk+1
∗ .
This completes the induction step and the proof.
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F Proof of Propositions 11, 12 and 13
First, I prove Proposition 12 which formalizes the recursive calculation of the highest
rationalizable bids for every type. This calculation is crucial for the proofs of Propositions
11 and 13. In order to prove Proposition 12, I state the following three lemmas which
formalize steps (I)-(III) in section 5. The proofs work analogously as for Lemmas 1, 2 and
3 in section 4 and are therefore omitted.
Lemma 4. For every bidder i and every valuation θk ∈ Θ there exists a unique highest
rationalizable bid b
θi
i .
Lemma 5. For every type zero is a rationalizable bid.
Lemma 6. For every type θk ∈ Θ it holds that every bid in [0, bθk ] is rationalizable.
Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. First, I examine the highest rationalizable bids of a bidder with valuation θk such
that θk is lower or equal than µ. Consider a subjective belief equilibrium where every bidder
has the subjective belief that the other bidders’ valuation distribution distributes the
probability weight between types θk and θµ where θµ = min{θk ∈ Θ | θk > µ}. Formally,
the distribution of the other bidders’ valuation is defined by the vector f θ
k
=
(
f θ
k
θ1 , . . . , f
θk
θm
)
where for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} it holds that f θkθj denotes the probability with which type θj
occurs. This vector is defined by
f θ
k
θk =
θµ − µ
θµ − θk , f
θk
θµ =
µ− θk
θµ − θk and f
θk
θj = 0 for θ
j 6= θk, θµ.
Given this subjective belief, in every subjective-belief equilibrium every bidder with
valuation θk bids θk. It follows from Proposition 9 that bidding θk is a rationalizable
action for a bidder with valuation θk. Since it is not rationalizable to bid above valuation,
θk is the highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation θk.
Now I examine the highest rationalizable bids of a bidder with valuation θk such
that θk is strictly greater than µ. Analogously as in the proof Proposition 5, the highest
rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation θk is induced by the strategy of the other
bidders’ such that
(i) All bidders with a lower type bid their highest rationalizable bid.
(ii) All bidders with an equal or higher type bid
(
b
θk
)−
.
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The strategies in (i) are rationalizable by definition and the strategies in (ii) are rationalizable
due to Lemma 6. It follows from Corollary 2 that a best reply to these strategies is
rationalizable. The highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation θk is a best reply
to the strategies in (i) and (ii) and to a distribution of the other bidders’ valuations. Let
the vector f θ
k
=
(
f θ
k
θ1 , . . . , f
θk
θm
)
be defined by fθj = 0 for j > k and let
(
f θ
k
θ1 , . . . , f
θk
θk
)
be
the unique solution of the system of k linear equations given by
k∑
i=1
f θ
k
θi = 1
k∑
i=1
f θ
k
θi θ
i = µ
(
f θ
k
θ1
)I−1
θk =
(
j∑
i=1
f θ
k
θi
)I−1 (
θk − bθj
)
for 1 < j < k.
It is to show that this is the unique solution of minimization problem
min max
l<k

(
l∑
i=1
fθi
)I−1 (
θk − bθl
)
s.t. fθj ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m
fθ1 + · · ·+ fθm = 1
fθ1θ
1 + · · ·+ fθmθm = µ.
Assume, this is not true. Then let f˜ θ
k
=
(
f˜ θ
k
θ1 , . . . , f˜
θk
θm
)
denote the solution vector of this
minimization problem, which I will denote by M θ
k
. Let (δθ1 , . . . , δθm) be numbers such
that (
f˜ θ
k
θ1 , . . . , f˜
θk
θm
)
=
(
f θ
k
θ1 + δθ1 , . . . , f
θk
θm + δθm
)
.
Since f˜ θ
k 6= f θk , it holds that at least one δθj for 1 ≤ j ≤ m is unequal to zero. Therefore,
as in the proof of Lemma ?? in section ??, one can decompose the vector (δθ1 , . . . , δθm)
into δ-sequences and if there does not exist a 1 ≤ t ≤ m with ∑tj=1 δθj > 0, the process of
decomposing into δ-sequences end with a δ-sequence of length 2, i.e. with some vector(
δfinal1 , δ
final
2
)
with δfinal1 < 0 and δ
final
2 > 0.
Assume there exists a 1 ≤ t ≤ m with ∑tj=1 δθj > 0. Since a bidder with valuation θk
never expects to win against an equal type and the mean µ has to be preserved, it is not
optimal for the adverse nature to put positive probability weight on types above θk. If
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there would be positive probability weight on types above θk, one could shift probability
weight from types above θk and types below θk to type θk in a way which preserves the
mean. Since this reduces the winning probability of a bidder with valuation θk, it cannot
be optimal for the adverse nature to put positive probability weight on types above θk.
Therefore, it holds that δθj > 0 for j > k. Since it must hold that
∑m
j=1 δθj = 0, it holds
that t < k. Let
h ∈ argmax
l<k

(
l∑
j=1
f˜θj
)I−1 (
θk − bθl
) .
This implies that (
h∑
j=1
f˜θj
)I−1 (
θk − bθh
)
is the minimum value of the objective function of minimization problem M θ
k
. Since f θ
k
is
an element of the feasible set of minimization problem M θ
k
, the vector f θ
k
cannot induce
a lower value of the objective function than f˜ θ
k
. Therefore, it holds that(
h∑
j=1
f˜θj
)I−1 (
θk − bθh
)
≤
(
h∑
j=1
fθj
)I−1 (
θk − bθh
)
⇔
(
h∑
j=1
fθj + δθj
)
I−1
√(
θk − bθh
)
≤
(
h∑
j=1
fθj
)
I−1
√(
θk − bθh
)
h∑
j=1
δθj ≤ 0. (9)
By definition of the vector f θ
k
, it holds that(
h∑
j=1
fθj
)I−1 (
θk − bθh
)
=
(
t∑
j=1
fθj
)I−1 (
θk − bθt
)
.
By definition of h, it holds that(
h∑
j=1
f˜θj
)I−1 (
θk − bθh
)
≥
(
t∑
j=1
f˜θj
)I−1 (
θk − bθt
)
from which follows that(
h∑
j=1
δθj
)
I−1
√
θk − bθh ≥
(
t∑
j=1
δθj
)
I−1
√
θk − bθt .
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Since
∑t
j=1 δθj > 0, it follows that
∑h
j=1 δθj > 0 which is a contradiction to (9). Therefore,
the process of decomposing into δ-sequences ends with some vector
(
δfinal1 , δ
final
2
)
with
δfinal1 < 0 and δ
final
2 > 0 and there exists a θ
final such that
m∑
j=1
δθjθ
j >
m∑
j=1
δθjθ
final = 0.
Since this is a contradiction to the fact that the vector f˜ θ
k
fulfills the constraint
m∑
j=1
f˜ θ
k
j θ
j = µ,
one can conclude that the assumption that the solution of minimization problem M θ
k
does
not coincide with the unique solution of the system of k linear equations as specified in
Proposition 11, leads to a contradiction. Therefore, the solution of this system of linear
equations is the unique distribution inducing the highest rationalizable bid of a bidder
with valuation θk.
Proof of Proposition 11 and Proposition 13
Proof. Given the distribution of the other bidders’ valuations, the adverse nature chooses
for a bidder with valuation θk ≤ µ, the bidder expects the lowest possible utility of zero.
Thus, the adverse nature does not have an incentive to deviate from this strategy. In order
to choose for a bidder with valuation θk > µ a distribution of the other bidders’ valuations,
the adverse nature has to solve the following minimization problem:
min max
l<k

(
l∑
i=1
f θ
k
θi
)I−1 (
θk − bθl
)
s.t. fθj ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m
f θ
k
θ1 + · · ·+ f θ
k
θm = 1
f θ
k
θ1 θ
1 + · · ·+ f θkθmθm = µ.
Since this minimization coincides with the minimization problem in the proof of Proposition
12 and the minimization problem has a unique solution, the distribution of the other
bidders’ valuations chosen by the adverse nature for a bidder with valuation θk > µ
coincides with the vector
(
f θ
k
θ1 , . . . , f
θk
θm
)
as specified in Proposition 12. A bidder with
valuation θk best replies to the adverse nature’s strategy. If θk ≤ µ, the bidder expects
a utility of zero and is indifferent between any bid between zero and her valuation. If
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θk > µ, the bidder is indifferent between any highest rationalizable bid of a lower type.
Thus, mixing among all highest rationalizable bids of lower types is a best reply to the
adverse nature’s strategy. In a maximin equilibrium every player with valuation θ > µ
will mix in a way such that the adverse nature does not have an incentive to deviate
from the proposed equilibrium. Thus, the strategies proposed in Propositions 11 and 13
indeed constitute a maximin equilibrium in the game with I players and an adverse nature.
Analogously as in the proof of Proposition 4, one can show that bidders’ strategies are
equal in every outcome under maximin strategies.
59
References
Battigalli, P. and M. Siniscalchi (2003a). Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
Games and Economic Behavior 45 (1), 38–72.
Battigalli, P. and M. Siniscalchi (2003b). Rationalization and incomplete information.
Advances in Theoretical Economics 3 (1).
Bergemann, D., B. Brooks, and S. Morris (2017). First-price auctions with general
information structures: Implications for bidding and revenue. Econometrica 85 (1),
107–143.
Bergemann, D. and S. Morris (2005). Robust mechanism design. Econometrica 73 (6),
1771–1813.
Bergemann, D. and S. Morris (2013). Robust predictions in games with incomplete
information. Econometrica 81 (4), 1251–1308.
Bergemann, D. and K. H. Schlag (2008). Pricing without Priors. Journal of the European
Economic Association 6 (2-3), 560–569.
Bernheim, B. D. (1984). Rationalizable strategic behavior. Econometrica: Journal of the
Econometric Society , 1007–1028.
Bose, S., E. Ozdenoren, and A. Pape (2006). Optimal auctions with ambiguity. Theoretical
Economics 1 (4), 411–438.
Carrasco, V., V. F. Luz, N. Kos, M. Messner, P. Monteiro, and H. Moreira (2018). Optimal
selling mechanisms under moment conditions. Journal of Economic Theory .
Carroll, G. (2016). Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion. Journal of
Economic Theory 166, 334–361.
Chen, Y., P. Katusˇcˇa´k, and E. Ozdenoren (2007). Sealed bid auctions with ambiguity:
Theory and experiments. Journal of Economic Theory 136 (1), 513–535.
Dekel, E. and A. Wolinsky (2001). Rationalizable outcomes of large independent
private-value first-price discrete auctions. northwestern university. Center for
Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Discussion Paper 1308.
Gilboa, I. and D. Schmeidler (1989). Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior.
Journal of mathematical economics 18 (2), 141–153.
60
Kasberger, B. and K. H. Schlag (2017). Robust bidding in first-price auctions: How to bid
without knowing what others are doing.
Lo, K. C. (1998). Sealed bid auctions with uncertainty averse bidders. Economic
Theory 12 (1), 1–20.
Montiero, P. K. (2009). First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution.
Games and Economic Behavior 65.1, 256–269.
Pearce, D. G. (1984). Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , 1029–1050.
Renou, L. and K. H. Schlag (2010). Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty. Journal of
Economic Theory 145 (1), 264–286.
Salo, A. and M. Weber (1995). Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 11 (2), 123–137.
Stoye, J. (2011). Axioms for minimax regret choice correspondences. Journal of Economic
Theory 146 (6), 2226–2251.
61
